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Cyberspace has become the “Wild West” of business opportunities for companies. The 
explosion of growth opportunities has also created substantial cyber insecurity for such 
companies. Large companies have the budget and resources to manage cybersecurity 
risks with the ability to hire experts to provide guidance and technology to address 
problems on a large corporate scale. Small and medium sized enterprises (SME), on the 
other hand, lack the funding, knowledge, and human capital to sufficient defend itself 
against the various criminals. This research analyzes three solutions for some of the 
major categorical problems for SMEs looking to manage cybersecurity risks without 
necessarily large investments in only highly technical solutions which include community 
policing for broad cooperation within industries, cyber insurance, and cyber hygiene. The 
research was based on literature review on existing literature including substantial 
government policy, and openly available information available on the Internet. Research 
yielded the necessity of adopting solutions beyond technology in order to improve 
security and resilience for SMEs. The proposed solutions are ideally applicable under 
specific scenarios for SMEs. Broad adoption may not yield the necessary security or 
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The topic of cybersecurity or rather insecurity in cyberspace has been a popular 
topic in the media and on Capitol Hill. Most of the attention has focused on high-profile 
data breaches and government mandates with little attention to possible solutions for 
mitigating such issues. Currently, the legal framework for managing cyberspace is weak 
(such as the Council of Europe’s Cybercrime Treaty) with most companies relying on 
proprietary approaches towards cybersecurity. In the private sector, large corporations 
have the resources and funds to manage its individual cybersecurity risks and policies and 
respond to incidents. However, small and medium enterprises (SME) are less likely to 
have the same kind of budget and resources to manage their cybersecurity risks 
effectively while they are more likely to be targeted by criminal hackers. Companies will 
have to continue to rely on proprietary measures for cybersecurity while the overall 
framework to manage cybersecurity and cybercrimes are formulated. 
The US government is in progress to create a voluntary framework through the 
recently published Executive Order (EO) 13636 as a directive to create a voluntary 
framework for securing US critical infrastructure in cyberspace; it is an addition to the 
US Presidential Directive 54 for the security of critical infrastructure. It is a rational 
mandate because companies own most of the country's infrastructure and the security of 
the private sector infrastructure is listed as one of the priorities for the national security. 
While the lack of the specific guidance provides a positive environment to suggest a 
variety of possible solutions, there has not been many initiatives by either sector to decide 
which solutions to execute. It is difficult to maintain a balanced approach to creating a 
voluntary framework that fulfill the voluntary requirement from the private sector and 
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maintain a high level of security sufficient for government standards.  
The lack of initiative to experiment with solutions could mean that the policy 
problem of cybersecurity presented as something more daunting than it actually is in 
reality. Companies are operating in cyberspace without much awareness of possible risks.  
While large companies can operate without sharing resources, small and medium 
enterprises suffer from the lack of access to resources that can improve its security under 
smaller budgets. An obvious solution that has been repeatedly mentioned by 
cybersecurity third party providers is the necessity for increased investment in technology 
to improve security but is it the only way to improve security? Are there alternatives to 
investing more money into technology? This paper aims to evaluate novel concepts and 
tools that have not received much attention in aims to improve cyber risk mitigation 
(internally and collaboratively) and risk transfer. Some investment and time would be 
required to implement any of these recommendations, but SMEs would benefit greatly 
from the aggregation of cybersecurity data. The greater access to information can help 
companies devise internal strategies to improve its security while operating in 
cyberspace. Finally, those who wish to implement their risk transfer can do it confidently 
that it has  
The thesis is comprised of three portfolio papers.  
The first portfolio paper focuses on community policing in cyberspace. This paper 
consists of seven parts. This paper consists of seven parts. The first part will introduce 
essential definitions to understand policing in cyberspace. The second part of the paper 
will provide an overview of existing law enforcement involvement in policing 
cyberspace. The third part will be a literature review. The fourth section will examine the 
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community policing concept. The fifth part of the paper will provide a methodology of 
necessary conditions for community policing and its application in cyberspace. The sixth 
part of the paper will explore the current challenges to adopting such an approach. The 
conclusion will discuss the importance of institutional leaders being open to changing 
policies with either completely new ideas or even adopting existing concepts. Evolution 
in cybersecurity is a necessity for both the private and public sectors to get ahead of 
criminals. 
The second portfolio paper is about captive insurance as an alternative to existing 
commercial cyber insurance products. The first part will introduce the literature review 
and essential definitions to understand cyber insurance. The second part of the paper will 
provide an overview of existing role and state of cyber insurance in overall risk 
management for companies operating in cyberspace. The third part of the paper will 
review the roadblocks to developing a mature commercial cyber insurance market. Then 
this paper will examine captive insurance as an alternative to the commercial cyber 
insurance. The fifth part of the paper will explore three examples of companies and their 
respective experiences in managing the cyber-related incident and the role of insurance 
played in each case. In the conclusion, the paper will examine the analysis of the three 
case studies and the importance of risk management for SMEs.  
The third paper is about cyber hygiene and its role in internally mitigating risk for 
end-users. This paper asks the following question: could the application of the concept 
“cyber hygiene” to an organization’s cybersecurity policy improve the effectiveness of 
addressing known virtual and physical vulnerabilities of a network’s security? The first 
part will present a survey of the existing research on human behavior in the context of 
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cybersecurity. The second part will examine the current public literature of federal 
agencies and defense contractors. The third part will propose a definition of cyber 























“Community Policing” in Cyberspace 
  
Introduction 
The current cyberspace environment is analogous to the days of the Wild West. 
The Internet was created to expand opportunities for individuals to electronically 
communicate with each other without much regard to law and order. Indeed, the lack of 
order is one of the primary positive characteristics of the Internet, but it comes with 
fostering a somewhat lawless environment. Over time, more sophisticated 
communication networks have been created. Improved communications have created a 
multi-billion dollar global economy. Virtual network gateways used to protect 
transactions and other proprietary information has been insufficient against criminal 
hackers.1 There are countless malevolent individuals and groups that operate freely in 
cyberspace while avoiding of the rule of law, such as organized criminal groups to 
hacktivist groups such as Anonymous and LulzSec. These groups have a variety of 
intentions, ranging from illegal financial gain to political aims. It is nearly impossible to 
maintain order over the Internet with the absence of a legal framework applied across 
most sovereign countries.  
The development of a global legal framework for cybersecurity has been slow. 
Many countries have created their respective cybersecurity organizations to research and 
craft policy responses to network breaches and other illegal activity. It may address 
cybercrimes committed within a sovereign territory, but it does not adequately respond to 
crimes committed across physical borders. Currently, there are no international treaties 
that have been widely adopted to govern cyberspace and manage policing of cybercrimes. 
                                                      
1 Sinrod, Eric J., and William P. Reilly. "Cyber-crimes: A practical approach to the application of federal 
computer crime laws." Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. LJ 16 (2000): 177.)  
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There have been attempts to adopt an international cybersecurity treaty such as the 
Council of Europe’s Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, but the COE has been 
unsuccessful in widely ratifying the treaty outside of Europe. Currently, there are only 
four non-European country members (Australia, Dominican Republic, Japan, and the 
United States) that have ratified the treaty. 2  Member countries’ domestic laws adhere to 
the treaty’s requirements of prosecuting offenses against the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of computer data, systems, and hardware; child pornography; copyright 
infringement; and network security.3 These laws show potentially allow the police to 
enforce laws based on the categories listed but do not provide specific guidance to law 
enforcement agencies on how to police these crimes committed in cyberspace. These 
types of crimes are similar to crimes in the real world but the assets involved or the 
method of how the crime was electronic-based. The lack of guidance for law enforcement 
has been both a blessing and a curse to law enforcement agencies. Most law enforcement 
agencies have been slow to develop procedures because of the lack of clarification, but 
there is potential for police to improve policing in cyberspace.  
Large enterprises recognize that operating cyberspace have inherent risks and 
most if not all have allocated resources focused on minimizing the risk of operating in 
cyberspace. Large enterprises have sophisticated information technology and security 
departments to formulate IT policies, and trained experts for active monitoring of its 
networks for data breaches. Large companies’ technology departments also have 
technical tools to manage internal network security. They are also likely to purchase 
                                                      
2 "Treaty Office." Council of Europe . N.p., n.d. Web. 24 July 2013. 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG>. 
3 "ETS No. 185 - Convention on Cybercrime." Council of Europe - Treaty Office. 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm (accessed August 6, 2013). 
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expensive memberships in public private partnerships such as information sharing and 
analysis centers (ISACs) to obtain high quality third party analysis and intelligence on 
potential threats. ISACs help inform companies about industry wide threats and share 
relevant information with government agencies. Large enterprises’ access to the human 
capital and technology will mitigate some of the risks of operating in the gray area of 
cyberspace- internally and externally. 
While large enterprises have taken steps to reduce the risk of operating in 
cyberspace, they are still vulnerable to becoming victims of cybercrimes. When these 
companies are victims of publicized cybercrimes, they experience significant financial 
repercussions.4  The severity of damages stemming from cybercrimes has had varying 
effects on companies. Indirect losses are hard to quantify but large publically traded 
companies such as Target and Home Depot have experienced significant downward 
pressure on the price of the stock after cybercrimes are publicly reported. Large 
multinational corporations are more likely to overcome direct losses from these crimes 
with vast balance sheets and potentially financial compensation from insurance. 
Small and medium enterprises (SME) generally have fewer resources to mitigate 
risks of operating in cyberspace. SMEs are less likely to have skilled skilled IT 
employees, much less a dedicated IT department to formulate IT policies to mitigate 
breaches, and business continuity planning. The lack of skilled employees to champion 
the importance of risk mitigation will also affect investments in memberships such as 
ISACs. More often than not, SMEs are likely to contract out active monitoring to third 
party companies with turnkey software or simple anti-virus software. This can pose a risk 
                                                      
4 Menn, Joseph . "Major Companies Keeping Cyber Attacks Secret from SEC, Investors: Report." 
Insurance Journal News. http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2012/02/02/233863.htm 
(accessed December 4, 2013). 
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in itself that vulnerable software offered by third party companies are likely to add 
exposure to data breaches if vulnerabilities can be systemically exploited or defenseless 
against skilled hackers.5  SME have smaller balance sheets or operating accounts to 
absorb direct losses stemming from cybercrimes. They are more likely to struggle from 
cybercrimes because they are also less likely to own adequate insurance to losses related 
to digital assets. While SMEs are less obvious targets, the assets and inherent 
vulnerabilities of SME can be attractive to criminal hackers. 
The individual losses and recovery costs experienced by companies are significant 
enough to warrant attention to improving mitigation of the risks of operating in 
cyberspace. Ponemon Institute conducted a study that showed a US company that was a 
cybercrime victim experienced a loss on average of $8.9 million, an increase of 6% from 
2011 and up 38% from 2010. 6 The cost comes from a combination of loss of intellectual 
property or confidential information, business disruption, lost revenue, and equipment 
and/or system damages. On average, each cleanup for a security breach cost $592,000, a 
42% increase from the average reported for 2011 cleanup cost of $416,000. 7 While these 
losses have not deterred companies from operating in cyberspace, this kind of unexpected 
loss is significant to the bottom line for many SMEs.  
This paper will argue that the adaptation of the real world community policing can 
be applied in cyberspace to increase legal order and a sense of security for all companies, 
especially SMEs. While the perception of security is not the same as real security, the 
                                                      
5 Weise, Elizabeth. "Antivirus Software Powerless against Sony Hackers." USA Today. December 6, 2014. 
Accessed February 3, 2015. http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/12/06/sony-attack-new-era-nuclear-
option/19963063/. 
6 "2012 Cost of Cyber Crime Study: United States." Ponemon Institute. 
www.ponemon.org/local/upload/file/2012_US_Cost_of_Cyber_Crime_Study_FINAL6%20.pdf (accessed 




minimum perception will beget a continuous commitment to maintaining security and 
cooperation towards mitigating risk by voluntary cooperation by companies. The 
increased cooperation between companies and law enforcement, on the whole, will 
increase the ability the law enforcement can better police cyberspace over time. Prior 
research shows that the community policing can possibly solve cybercrimes on a global 
scale, but this paper will focus on crimes that affect the private sector in the United 
States.  
This paper consists of seven parts. The first part will introduce essential 
definitions to understand policing in cyberspace. The second part of the paper will 
provide an overview of existing law enforcement involvement in policing cyberspace. 
The third part will be a literature review. The fourth part will examine the community 
policing concept. The fifth part of the paper will provide a methodology of necessary 
conditions for community policing and its application in cyberspace. The sixth part of the 
paper will explore the current challenges to adopting such an approach. The conclusion 
will discuss the importance of institutional leaders being open to changing policies with 
either completely new ideas or even adopting existing concepts. Evolution in 




This paper focuses on the application of ‘community policing’ in cyberspace as a 
public and private sector partnership with clearly delineated roles for both parties. It does 
not include police utilization of cyberspace to investigate crimes committed in the 
physical realm. While the utilization of electronic evidence found in cyberspace is under 
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development, it will not be within the paper’s scope. The primary focus of the paper will 
focus on electronic crimes committed against companies in cyberspace and a proposal of 
redefining information sharing and cooperation for between the public and private 
sectors. The definitions will help understand the terminology that is relevant to the 
medium, some of the cybercrimes, and the definition ‘community policing.’  
Cyberspace is a term that is used interchangeably with the term- Internet. The 
Internet is comprised of physically connected networks around the world, many have 
viewed cyberspace as the physical identity for computer-mediated communications.8 It 
should not be confused with virtual reality where individuals adopt telepresence and 
function in a separate world. 9 Real world threats are more likely to be visible, whereas  
cyberspace threats/crimes may not be all that apparent to users and organizations. There 
are a number of terms typically used when discussing technical activities used in 
committing cybercrimes.  
An important term to attempt to define is cybercrime itself. There is a variety of 
definitions of cybercrime. Surprisingly in the US, there is no official definition of 
cybercrime that distinguishes crimes committed in cyberspace and the real world. 10 
Cybercrimes are often used interchangeably with the Internet or other technology related 
crimes.11 The most widely accepted definition would arguably originate from the Council 
of Europe since it is currently the most widely adopted treaty on cybercrime. Council of 
Europe’s Convention of Cybercrime focuses on “crimes committed via the Internet and 
                                                      
8 Joinson, Adam N. "Self‐disclosure in computer‐mediated communication: The role of self‐awareness and 
visual anonymity." European Journal of Social Psychology 31, no. 2 (2001): 177-192. 
9 Steuer, Jonathan. "Defining virtual reality: Dimensions determining telepresence." Journal of 
communication 42, no. 4 (1992): 73-93. 
10 Finklea, Kristin M. , and Catherine A. Theohary . "Cybercrime: Conceptual Issues for Congress and U.S. 
Law Enforcement." Federation of American Scientists. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42547.pdf 




other computer networks, dealing particularly with infringements of copyright, computer-
related fraud, child pornography and violations of network security.” 12  
The Convention of Cybercrime provides guidance on the types of crime but can 
also be too constrained in its definition. Thomas and Loader viewed cybercrimes as 
“computer-mediated activities that are either illegal or considered illicit by certain parties 
and conducted through global electronic networks.” 13 The definition by Thomas and 
Loader is almost sufficient for identifying the tangible and intangible related to cyber-
crimes except that it limits the type of equipment that can be used to commit these 
activities such as cell phones. Gordon and Ford expand on the definition by broadening 
the type of equipment used in cybercrimes by defining cybercrime as “any crime 
facilitated or committed using a computer, network, or hardware device.” 14 The last two 
definitions are more appropriate in broadly understanding the types of activities that can 
be considered as cybercrimes. The COE’s definition is limiting in comparison, but it does 
provide some guidance by listing specific activities that qualify as cyber-crimes.  
There are endless definitions for cybercrime because there is a variety of aspects 
to consider about cybercrime. The components of a cybercrime vary in three ways of 1) 
In some cybercrimes that computers or data are the targets. 2) Computers or digital 
technologies used as tools for committing cybercrimes. 3) Technological devices carry 
evidence when used as tools for committing cybercrimes.15 Some real world crimes use 
technology to steal information, such as point of sale skimming. It occurs when a device  
                                                      
12 "Summary of the Convention on Cybercrime (CETS No. 185)." Council of Europe - Treaty Office. 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Summaries/Html/185.htm (accessed August 4, 2013). 
13 Loader, Brian D., and Douglas Thomas, eds. Cybercrime: Security and surveillance in the information 
age. Routledge, 2013. 
14 Gordon, Sarah, and Richard Ford. "On the definition and classification of cybercrime." Journal in 
Computer Virology 2, no. 1 (2006): 13-20. 
15 Finklea, Kristin M. , and Catherine A. Theohary . "Cybercrime: Conceptual Issues for Congress and U.S. 
Law Enforcement." Federation of American Scientists. 
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is placed on top or replacing an existing card slot on a credit card reader or ATM. The 
device copies the magnetic stripe information and pin information, information is then 
broadcasted to criminals.16 Information can then be burned onto blank cards to withdraw 
money or sold online in batches.  
The complexity of these crimes can vary on the tools used to commit such crimes. 
Some of them can be as simple as accessing illegal content such as child pornography or 
illegally downloading copyrighted material such as music and movies. Other crimes can 
be very sophisticated such as creating botnets and distributed denial of service (DDoS.) 
These two digital tools require a sophisticated knowledge of utilizing computers and 
programming. Some of the tools, such as botnets and DDoS, are now sold as crime as a 
service to traditional criminals or criminal groups. These criminal users can lease the 
software for any period of time while the software is maintained by hackers.17 This kind 
software has empowered groups that have the ambition to control computers illegally for 
the aim of stealing money or holding companies hostage without the complex technology 
knowledge to implement such software. 
Phishing is a scheme to obtain personal identifiable or financial information 
deceitfully from unsuspecting individuals. This is usually executed by large batches of 
fraudulent emails purportedly sent from legitimate organizations, to potential victims 
requesting information. Some criminals are sophisticated enough to locate electronically 
stored documents with the victim’s signature and replicated phone numbers when service 
providers attempt to confirm the victim’s information as experienced by firms such as 
                                                      
16 Bid. 
17 Sood, Aditya K., and Richard J. Enbody. "Crimeware-as-a-service—a survey of commoditized 




Morgan Stanley in Washington DC. This is a serious problem, especially for financial 
services firms that manage large amounts of money because there are times that good 
compliance measures cannot easily overcome the sophisticated criminal’s ability to 
provide evidence to confirm authorizations to transfer money.  
Distributed denial of service (DDOS) is an attack by hackers on computers and 
specific networks to prevent legitimate users from accessing the intended information. 18 
The most common tactic to carry out such attack is by flooding the target with 
information that overwhelms the targeted website is no longer accessible to the intended 
users. For some organizations that experience this kind of crime when a malicious 
hacker(s) attempts to subvert the organization by prevent legitimate users from accessing 
its website. US banks such as Bank of America, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, and others 
experienced this in the fall of 2013 when their websites faced major disruptions.19 Cyber 
experts such as James Lewis and US intelligence officials believed this campaign was 
organized by Iran.20 These types of attacks are viewed as a form of a political message. 
SQL injection is a type of attack that undermines the relationship between a 
website and its supporting database. The Code specifically developed for a SQL injection 
will deceive the database system into executing malicious code.21  The action is a 
combination of exploiting database vulnerabilities, over-elevated permissions of certain 
                                                      
18 US CERT. "Security Tip (ST04-015)." Understanding Denial-of-Service Attacks. http://www.us-
cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-015 (accessed March 24, 2014). 
19 Perlroth, Nicole, and Quentin Hardy. "Bank Hacking Was the Work of Iranians, Officials Say." The New 








users, unsanitized/untyped user input, and/or software (database) vulnerabilities. 22 These 
type of attacks can occur even when there are no known vulnerabilities in a database and 
much more complex than a typical security patch because it can hide within the countless 
amounts of information.  “Community policing” is a concept that emphasizes working 
partnerships between police and communities to enhance a sense of security and trust in 
order to reduce crime. The definition by the Department of Justice is “a philosophy that 
promotes organizational change strategies, which support the systematic use of 
partnerships and problem-solving techniques, to proactively address the immediate 
conditions that give rise to public safety issues, such as crime, disorder, and fear of 
crime.”23 The concept focuses on a collaborative approach involving multiple 
stakeholders in order to resolve conditions that can lead to the sense of insecurity. One of 
the important components of a thriving community is the business community. 
Businesses require a secure environment in order to conduct transactions.  
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers are an example of a public-private 
partnership created to encourage dialogue between industry and the government. These 
organizations gather, share and disseminate information related to both physical and 
cyber threats to companies within a specific sector and the federal government. 24 ISACs 
are private organizations dedicated to the fifteen industries considered to be critical 
infrastructure by the federal government. It was voluntarily created by companies within 
their respective critical infrastructure sector in response to Presidential Decision Directive 
                                                      
22 Ibid. 
23 "COPS Office: What is Community Policing?." COPS Office. 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=36 (accessed March 10, 2013). 
24 Relyea, Harold C., and Jeffrey W. Seifert. "Information Sharing for Homeland Security: A Brief 




63. Critical infrastructure is comprised of assets, systems, and networks, physical or 
virtual, which are vital to the country that incapacitation or destruction would cripple the 
country’s national security.25 Approximately 85% of the country’s critical infrastructure is 
owned by the private sector that can be categorized into 16 sectors as organized by the 
Presidential Policy Directive 21. 26 There are 16 Information Sharing and Analysis 
Centers in the United States. Most US companies fall into some critical infrastructure, 
and therefore they qualify to join a relevant sector ISAC.   
ISACs’ missions are focused on the real time threats of its respective sectors. The 
ISACs have developed independently to serve the respective needs of the industries. 
ISACs were formed by one of two ways. One was legal incorporation and independent 
operations or contracting operations out to a security firm. 27 Banking, information, 
water, oil and gas, railroad, and mass transit industries used the approach. The second 
model was utilizing an existing organization that coordinated government-industry efforts 
and added critical infrastructure protection to the mission of the group. Electric power 
uses the North American Electricity Reliability Council, and the telecommunications 
sector uses the National Coordinating Center. 28 These organizations have developed 
unique management structures and services tailored to their respective sectors. ISAC 
funding has varied with some have received funding from government agencies either for 
start-up purposes or ongoing funding or others completely self-sufficient. Some ISACs 
have formed an umbrella group called the ISAC Council to help facilitate additional 
                                                      
25 "What Is Critical Infrastructure?." Homeland Security. http://www.dhs.gov/what-critical-infrastructure 
(accessed December 7, 2013). 
26 Ibid. 





coordination. 29 The manner in which these organizations have progressed from its 
funding to organization shows that the mission is very much focused on the gathering, 
sharing, and disseminating threats to the sector members. However, it is not necessarily 
clear these organizations have a systemic approach to mitigating cybercrime threats in a 
meaningful manner. 
These organizations are charged with mandates to help coordinate communication 
and information sharing between the private sector and federal agencies regarding the 
security of all types including cyber. One of the critiques of these organizations is that 
there is no clear delineation of responsibilities between the ISACs and federal agencies. 
Though this cannot be completely the fault of the ISACs or federal agencies, a GAO 
report identifying that the DHS is responsible for a coordination strategy. This is one of 
the ongoing issues facing public-private partnerships, many federal agencies are tasked 
with mandates without guidance on how to proceed. It is difficult to clearly to delineate 
the roles that each organization (governmental or private-partnerships) plays in 
ecosystem of cyberspace security.  
Current Law and Order in Cyberspace 
There is no explicit US national strategy for policing cybercrimes but there are a 
number of national level organizations that list cybercrime as one of its objectives. The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation was listed in the President’s National Strategy to Secure 
Cyberspace in 2003 as the leading federal law enforcement agency in the United States in 
charge of investigating cybercrimes.30 The US Secret Service is responsible for 
                                                      
29 Ibid. 
30 "Addressing Threats to the Nation’s Cybersecurity." FBI . http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/investigate/cyber/addressing-threats-to-the-nations-cybersecurity (accessed April 8, 2013). 
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investigating crimes that involve the financial infrastructure and payment systems. 31 The 
US Secret Service was mandated by the Patriot Act to establish a national network of 
Electronic Crimes Task Forces (ECTF.) These ECTFs are working partnerships with 
private industry, academia, local and state authorities, and prosecutors.32 There are 25 
ECTFs located in major cities all over the United States. In the private sector, ISACs are 
where member companies share anonymized information regarding the physical and 
cyber threats and vulnerabilities as directed originally by Presidential Directive 63 and 
later updated in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7. 33 Domestic Security 
Alliance Council and InfraGard are both lead by the FBI to facilitate information sharing 
and cooperation between US companies and FBI and Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS.) 34 Other organizations related to cybersecurity such as the Homeland Security 
Information Network which is a communication network for sharing and analyzing real-
time threat information at federal, state, and local law enforcement. US-CERT (U.S. 
Computer Emergency Readiness Team) publishes information on the latest computer-
related vulnerabilities, threats, and information on how to respond.35  These organizations 
have roles in information gathering, organizing, investigation, dissemination, and sharing 
but it is easy for the uninitiated in cyber security to be easily confused on exactly which 
organizations can help them in the event they experience a cyber-related incident. 
Under the current policing regime in cyberspace, there have been some successful 
                                                      
31 "Vision and Mission Statements." United States Secret Service. 
http://www.secretservice.gov/mission.shtml (accessed August 4, 2013). 
32 "Electronic Crimes Task Forces and Working Groups." United States Secret Service. 
http://www.secretservice.gov/ectf.shtml (accessed August 6, 2013). 
33 "About FS-ISAC." FS-ISAC : Financial Services. https://www.fsisac.com/about (accessed December 7, 
2013). 
34
 "Welcome to the Domestic Security Alliance Council." Domestic Security Alliance Council. 
http://www.dsac.gov/Pages/index.aspx (accessed December 21, 2013). 




indictments of criminal users. In July 2013, there was a very significant indictment for 
the largest known data breach. The US Secret Service led the investigation that led to the 
indictment by the New Jersey state attorney. Five individuals were listed in the 
conspiracy indictment. Four were Russian citizens-Vladimir Drinkman, Alexandr 
Kalinin, Roman Kotov, and Dmitriy Smilianets; and one Ukranian-Mikhail Rytikov. 
Drinkman and Kalinin respectively specialized in penetrating network security and 
accessing network systems. Kotov specialized in mining networks. Rytikov provided 
anonymous web-hosting services. Smilianets sold the stolen information and distributed 
the proceeds to the other conspirators. The conspirators were accused of penetrating the 
computer networks of the several largest payment processing companies, retailers, and 
financial institutions such as Heartland Payment Systems, JCP, Dow Jones, Visa Jordan, 
and Diners Singapore. 
The group entered those corporate networks by identifying vulnerabilities in SQL 
databases and used those vulnerabilities in an SQL injection attack to gain entry. The 
group also left malicious code or malware to re-enter the compromised network easily. If 
the company’s computer security removed the malware, the group would patiently and 
persistently attack until they regained entry into these networks.  The group stole 
usernames and passwords, personal identification information, credit and debit card 
numbers. The group stole a conservative estimate of more than 160 million card numbers. 
The group then sold the stolen credit card numbers and associated information in batches 
called “dumps” to resellers around the world. The buyers of these dumps would resell the 
dumps to other individuals or organizations either directly or through online forums. The 
cards and its associated information were charged different according to the country of 
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origin; US cards were $10, European cards were $50, and Canadian cards were $15 each.   
It took years for law enforcement to discover the group and the arrests of the 
members of the group were just as difficult.  The conspirators proactively covered their 
tracks of their illegal activities. Rytikov allowed his clients to hack companies with the 
agreement that his company would not keep records of the group’s online activities or 
communicate with law enforcement. The other defendants also communicated through 
private and encrypted communication channels. Some of the defendants attempted to 
meet in person to avoid law enforcement inception of their private communication.  
The majority of the conspirators avoided arrest, but Smilianets was the easiest to 
trace out of the group because he was interacting with many people in order to sell the 
“dumps” of credit card information. He was already well known because of his high 
profile in Russia as the founder of a championship electronic gaming team. Law 
enforcement received some information about Smilianets travel to Europe with a friend. 
The friend was Drinkman who actively posted information about their trip on social 
media websites that law enforcement deduced where they were both staying.36  Drinkman 
and Smilianets were both arrested on June 28, 2012. Smilianets was extradited to the 
United States on September 7, 2012 while Drinkman is still fighting extradition in the 
Netherlands. The rest of the group remains at large. 
In an older case investigated by the FBI, the law enforcement agency successfully 
infiltrated a very exclusive black market forum called the “Dark Market.” Criminals 
bought and sold stolen financial information, stolen login credentials, stolen credit card 
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information, and even tools to commit financial crimes in the Dark Market.37 The 
electronic market was not an ordinary forum that anyone could join: members had to be 
vetted before operating in the black market. At its peak, the “Dark Market” had as many 
as 2,500 registered members. The FBI conducted a two-year undercover cybercrime 
investigation, working closely with the U.K.’s Serious Organised Crime Agency, the 
Turkish National Police, and the German Federal Criminal Police.38 FBI infiltrated the 
“Dark Market” with an agent, named Master Splyntr, posing as cyber criminal and 
installing himself as the site administrator. The investigated ended in 2008 with 60 arrests 
around the world and prevented the $70 million in economic loss. 39 The founder of Dark 
Market, Renukanth Subramnian, was found guilty in a British court and ordered to serve 
46 months for conspiracy to defraud and ten months for five counts of mortgage fraud. 40 
It is not the most egregious case, but it highlights that criminals are enterprising types that 
are not just focused on hacking. These types of underground markets are perpetuating the 
availability of criminal software in cyberspace.   
These prior examples are a small part of an asymmetrical environment where 
criminals continue to experience low barriers of entry to committing cybercrimes and 
relatively low risk of arrest and prosecution. There are a number of government 
organizations responsible for managing cybersecurity on a broad scale, but companies 
carry the burden of spending significant sums of money to defend against internal and 
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external threats to the network security. Cyber crimes perpetuate because it does not 
require as many resources or technical knowledge to exploit the weaknesses of an 
organization, although groups attempting to commit crimes on an enterprise level usually 
include expert hackers with a variety of technical skills to commit crimes in an organized 
fashion. The numbers of cyberspace crimes continue outpace the number of law 
enforcement officers who are skilled enough to track them down.41  The reward for 
committing crimes to earn relatively easy cash or bragging rights to penetrating and 
interrupting networks for a political purpose such as Anonymous will continue to 
perpetuate crimes with political goals. Many of the criminals operate in countries that 
allow impunity, such as Eastern European countries, Russia, and China. The combination 
of the relative low risk and high rewards will continue to perpetuate cybercrimes unless 
law enforcement policies change. 
The current policing of criminals who commit cybercrimes have been ineffective. 
Most continue to commit crimes without fear of prosecution and arrest. The publicized 
arrests and prosecutions of criminal hackers are exceptions to the norm. Due to the 
limited time and resources available to investigate crimes, of any type, are usually 
utilized by the most economically significant cases that feature large companies as 
victims rather than lesser known SMEs. There is a shortage of law officers trained in the 
technical aspects of the cybercriminal world and forensics experts in cybercrimes. The 
lack of qualified professionals to investigate cybercrimes will continue to benefit 
criminals. If investigations are initiated, it can take months if not years to complete as the 
prior examples demonstrated. Law enforcement involved in undercover investigations 
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need time to build the relationships with the small circles of criminals involved in the 
cybercrimes. Even arresting criminals can take time with time, to locate criminals and 
extradite from the country where the criminal is arrested and send them to the country 
with the criminal indictment. Collecting evidence that can be admissible in court is still 
under development. Law enforcement are starting to increase training and hiring of 
individuals experienced in dealing with such crimes, but it is not at a pace that will come 
close to meeting the demand of investing most cybercrimes. 
Current policing within cyberspace shows a lack of a cohesive strategy that 
clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of the private sector companies and the law 
enforcement. The largest companies that have significant resources are more likely to 
institute tools that mitigate a fair amount of risk. While SMEs lack the same kind of 
resources and human capital to mitigate risk and plan for unexpected cyber incidents. 
Companies within industries lacking in coordination of information sharing and 
responsiveness unknowingly experience systemic threats if there are state-sponsored 
criminal hackers who can operate with impunity. The lack of minimum security 
requirements within respective industries places an outsized burden on law enforcement 
to maintain security or at least the perception of security in cyberspace. The limited 
resources of law enforcement cannot sufficiently carry the burden and that its efforts need 
to focus on investigating in a manner that is effective in coordinating with the private 
sector. The cooperation and sufficient coverage of arrests will improve the perception of 
security towards raising the cost-benefit analysis for criminals who consider in engaging 
criminal activities in cyberspace. 
Literature Review  
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The concept of community policing in the real world has explored from many 
angles, but there is limited existing research on the concept of “community policing” in 
the cyberspace realm. The available research shows a number of major viewpoints on 
police involvement in cyberspace.  
One of the concepts is reliance on private self-help, where individuals are 
incentivized to protect themselves against crime. 42 Neal Katyal wrote about the concept 
of “community” self-help, where there is a greater emphasis on the precautions taken by 
a community rather than by individuals or completely relying on law enforcement. Katyal 
states that each camp will have to admit that its method alone is ineffective against crime: 
Lone actors who try to stop crimes by themselves cannot be trusted, and their success in 
reducing crime will also increase the amount of fear of crimes. Law enforcement 
crackdowns on crime can fray a community, possibly producing counterproductive 
results.43 Moreover, in a complete self-help model, wealthier individuals who can afford 
to protect themselves would transfer some of the crime to their poorer neighbors. As an 
alternative, Katyal supports cooperative prevention over prosecution or retribution.  In 
the approach recommended by Katyal, local “realspace” neighborhoods would coordinate 
with law enforcement as opposed to both parties reacting independently of each other. 
Community self-help would ideally balance the goals of formal and informal 
enforcement of laws and socially accepted norms. The term neighborhood was not 
specifically defined by the author. It can be a confined area where a group of people 
living in close vicinity of one another such as a gated community as referred to by the 
author. Kaytal recommends that community policing in realspace has potential in 
                                                      




lowering crime rates and recommends exploring the concept in cyberspace and should 
look at realspace examples of community policing for guidance.  
Benjamin Jones took a different approach with the concept of community policing 
in cyberspace. He argued that a community approach by programmers and developers to 
create open source software code especially in the operating system and Internet browser 
markets that will deter cybercrimes.44 The success of the open source software will be 
distributing information across the entire community of software users. There are 
instances of these projects such as GitHub, currently the largest open source community 
to share code between software developers.45 While this concept will more likely work 
for less sophisticated cybercrimes across the entire cyberspace such as ransomware-
software that will hold the computer functionality hostage until the user pays a ransom.46 
The paper disagrees that corporations and governments are less likely to participate in 
such a proposition since it does not sufficiently address crimes such as targeted phishing.  
A prominent scholar in cybercrimes, David Wall, argued that police will have to 
cooperate with various groups such as Internet user groups, virtual environment 
managers, Internet service providers, corporate security organizations, etc involved in 
enforcing norms and laws.47  Wall identified a larger ecosystem of organizations that 
enforce norms and laws in cyberspace. Wall argued that police forging relationships with 
the other cooperative partners would improve policing in cyberspace. He also argued that 
governance should be configured to assist and strengthen the Internet’s natural inclination 
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to police itself.48  The desire to automate policing may evolve from a ‘disciplinary 
society’ to a ‘control society’ where actions can be analyzed for predicting criminal 
behavior.49 This paper disagrees that policing will become sophisticated enough in the 
near term to solve crimes committed by talented hackers. While Wall was able to identify 
a larger ecosystem of interested parties, there is not enough depth on possible specifics on 
how to forge productive relationships with these disparate groups to improve cyberspace 
policing.  
These authors make important contributions by presenting in-depth focus on 
aspects of the overall community policing concept on a very broad scale. In an attempt to 
solve a broad problem with broad solutions will not adequately solve anyones’ problems. 
The lack of specificity in the responsibilities for user groups reduces the effectiveness of 
improving security in cyberspace. It is dangerous because it will take away resources 
from solutions that can accomplish less but in a more effective manner.   
Understanding Criteria for Successful “Community Policing” 
The components of successful “community policing” involve a working 
relationship with regular communication with local police officers, residents, and 
community stakeholders such as community leaders, media, and business owners. There 
are necessary attributes to any successful “community policing” relationship, including: 
empowerment of the community; belief in a broad police function; reliance of police on 
citizens for authority, information, and collaboration; specific tactics targeted at particular 
problems unique to the community; and decentralized authority to better respond to 





neighborhood needs.50 The increased communication between both parties and 
reorientation from a focus on internal police performance metrics to the perception of 
safety within the neighborhood should be considered again. 
The implementation of “community policing” should be a starting point to build a 
cooperative relationship between the law enforcement and the community. So the two 
parties can co-create an approach towards solving the community’s problems. Over time, 
the working relationship between the community and the police would ideally foster trust 
and an open environment for communication.51 In an ideal situation, there is regular 
interaction between community stakeholders and local law enforcement. The community 
can communicate what it perceives as threats to its safety and law enforcement can create 
and implement strategies to fulfill those needs while also enabling the law enforcement 
agencies communicate potential threats identified through its intelligence gathering 
activities. The service-oriented approach should foster an environment perceived safe by 
all community stakeholders to function and thrive. Security considerations by a 
neighborhood may or may not be the same as the prior police metrics for performance. 
The increased perception of security will beget involvement from community members to 
share information to prevent further criminal incidents from affecting the rest of the 
community. The criteria for a successful “community policing” in cyberspace will follow 
a similar fashion to its real world counterpart. The criteria as follows: 
• Participation from all stakeholders in the community 
• Regular communication between the community and law enforcement 
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• Collection and analysis of information from the community  
• Decentralized authority for law enforcement to respond to the 
community’s needs 
• Resolve particular problems for the community 
• Assess the effectiveness of the solutions 
 
To apply the concept of community policing in cyberspace, it will require some 
adaptation due to its unique nature of cyberspace and its borderless environment. First, 
the definition of ‘community’ will focus on companies only rather than including 
individuals in cyberspace. The community aspect would the interactions within the 
ISACs. These types of organizations already exist and function as a conduit between 
companies and the federal government. It will not require significant additional 
investment in restructuring the infrastructure to support companies on a wider and more 
effective scale.  
The complexity of attempting to police the cyberspace on a broad scale would 
take time to implement. The increased focus on sub-user groups rather than the broader 
population will improve the overall effectiveness of the solution because the needs will 
be better aligned when focused on sub industries. The lack of geographical constraints in 
cyberspace will limit the ability of the community policing through the local police. Law 
enforcement in the cyberspace context will focus on federal agencies rather than local 
police in order to better pursue criminals on a sustained basis and cooperation for 
extradition. Federal agencies will also have budgets and experience to hire or train 
technical experts and agents dedicated to policing cybercrimes.  
Can “Community Policing” be applied to Cyberspace? 
The first requirement is to have participation from all stakeholders in the 
community, specifically the industry. Participation within the industry requires incentives 
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to attract companies to invest in a group effort to combat cybercrimes. There are two 
approaches to incentivize companies to participate with 1) assurances that anonymized 
information shared will not break anti-trust rules or shared beyond its original purposes 
of technical analysis for criminal activities 2) financial incentives such as lower cyber 
insurance premiums or tax benefits for participating companies. The anonymous 
information shared with the insurance industry will provide more information to needed 
to calculate the actuarial risk of accepting an insured company’s operating risk in 
cyberspace. Large and small-medium enterprises will be incentivized to participate on a 
broad scale. Large enterprises will benefit from the enhanced power of group sourced 
information and another layer of situational awareness of operating in cyberspace in 
addition to proprietary tools. SMEs will have access to better industrial and systemic 
threat analysis and additional information through wider participation that would not be 
easily attained on an individual basis. In order for the concept to be applied in 
cyberspace, high participation is a necessary. As companies of sall sizes experience 
cybercrimes, it will increase the likelihood that they will be self-motivated to join to 
mitigate the risk of experiencing additional cybercrimes.   
Another aspect of successful community policing is the ability to identify clearly 
and articulate security problems for the community. In order to clearly identify problems 
for the community, the size of the community needs to be subdivided into a manageable 
size to identify problems that affect smaller groups accurately. Instead of focusing on the 
traditional smaller geographic neighborhood in traditional community policing, the 
concept can be applied by dividing the size of the broad industry into sub-groups within 
industries by similar risk and use patterns. Once companies have been grouped together 
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based on similar operating and risk profiles, there will be aggregate continuous 
monitoring within the sub-groups. It allows ISACs to pool resources such as technical 
experts and to narrow the range of acceptable activity and highlight highly unusual 
activity within the sub-groups. The benefit of creating these sub-groups of member 
companies will not only include continuous monitoring for potential cybercrimes but also 
the ability to analyze continuous real-time activity for abnormal patterns. Continuous 
analysis could enable the identification of potential criminal activity within a sub-group 
of similar peers. ISAC technical specialists will analyze activity to establish a range of 
acceptable regular activity. Analysts can report if there are campaign attacks on 
subgroups of companies or if there are broader industry threats. The ISAC experts can 
offer a third party opinion of activity and forensic services after incidents are reported to 
the broad industry membership. Any potential cybercrime activity or threats will be 
reported to members of the affected sub-group and possibly to the broader industry ISAC. 
The ISAC can assist in reporting of the incident to the appropriate law enforcement 
organization while protecting the integrity of data as evidence.  A record of the 
cybercrime will be filed in the ISAC database will be built on the activity. Any future 
cybercrime activity will be compared to the existing database to examine whether it fits a 
pattern of cybercrime. It will help build up a repository of profiled but yet unidentified 
patterns of activity to be shared with law enforcement and prosecutors to investigate, 
identify, and indictment/arrest. Information shared with the appropriate law enforcement 
agencies will contribute to the development of cyber forensics and improved policies for 
managing cybercrime investigations.    
In the partnership facilitated by the ISAC between industry and the law 
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enforcement, it naturally empowers law enforcement in a decentralized manner. The flow 
of information from the companies will be controlled in a way that enables police to 
focus on investigations in aiding companies in identifying the identities of cyber 
criminals. And increase the ability of companies to cooperate with the prosecutors to file 
indictments against unidentified and identified criminal hackers. The law enforcement 
can also share information with the private sector by using ISACs as conduits. By 
communicating in a neutral forum that was created by the private sector industries, it is 
more likely to be accepted by the sector, and the sector will be more likely to share 
information. It will take time and regular meetings to build the relationships (executive 
and technical) between the law enforcement, ISAC, and member companies.  
Relying on a neutral forum as a point of reference for both the private sector and 
the law enforcement will encourage both sides to come together to meet their common 
interests of combating cybercrime. As both groups learn to trust and cooperate with each 
other in their defined roles, the private sector companies can use the forum to 
communicate problems to the law enforcement and develop a cooperative solution in 
resolving issues. Ongoing security issue will vary among subgroups of the industries. 
ISACs can help prioritize the problems within the sub-groups and look for potential 
problems that affect the industry in a systemic manner. The law enforcement can either 
immediately resolve problems or create a plan to work towards an acceptable solution. 
Performance assessments of the law enforcement and the ISAC determined by 
qualitative and non-qualitative categories in communication (especially in building 
relationships, identifying and resolving particular problems for the sub-groups within the 
industrial community); criminal investigations to identify criminal hackers; and 
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arrests/extradition. While internal assessments conducted for the law enforcement 
organization’s edification, there should also be a joint assessment conducted jointly with 
the other stakeholders- ISAC and the member companies. The joint assessment should be 
tied to performance-related pay and/or bonus. The appraisal would be on an annual basis 
and evaluations provided by not just the law enforcement but also other stakeholders in 
the three-way partnership between the private sector and the law enforcement. This 
scenari maintains an environment of transparency and cooperation between the three 
parties.  
The application of community policing in cyberspace by the United States can be 
a leading example of innovation on fighting cybercrime against companies. The global 
implications of applying a decentralized policing strategy will encourage other national 
governments to model a functioning public-private partnership that coordinates efforts 
between the law enforcement and the private sector companies in mitigating and 
responding to cybercrimes. The borderless nature of cyberspace does not allow a purely 
one-sided solution either from the users or the government. The former group does not 
have the legal standing to enforce laws and the latter does not have the technology or the 
human capital to enforce laws effectively. The community policing solution will not solve 
all of the possible types of cybercrimes committed within cyberspace, but it is a start to a 
decentralized and yet systematic response in the aftermath of cybercrimes against 
industries. The decentralized approach will enable both law enforcement to respond more 
effectively by investigating cybercrimes and efficiently communicating with companies 
on evolving real-time threats. Real life policing will not mitigate all forms of cybercrime 
because the complications posed by the asymmetrical environment. Defenders invest 
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further into its network security more than attackers have to invest into coding. While this 
proposal aims to improve policing on its own, it does not address other issues vital to 
establishing a sustainable global system to improve the overall security within 
cyberspace. Other components to improve prosecution will involve improving extradition 
and prosecution. Successful arrests of criminal hacker and prosecution will improve 
attribution and increase the risk that criminals must consider before committing 
cybercrimes.  
Challenges to the Adoption of ‘Community Policing’ 
 There are a number of significant challenges to the adoption of the concept 
but in a controlled environment with a small number of stakeholders make the concept 
feasible. Some of the challenges are technical, but the most significant obstacle will stem 
from the leadership of both public and private sectors. This kind of investment will 
require the significant political will to enact from both parties. Additional complications 
will include funding, opposition from entrenched agencies with overlapping missions, 
and inertia to deviate from the status quo. Companies and the government organizations 
are likely to be resistant to funding new concepts unless there is an obvious benefit or 
measurable returns. There are other cybersecurity tactics and third party cybersecurity 
firms that are also competing for attention and more importantly funding. While the 
concerns are valid about experimenting with new concepts. It is worthwhile to note that 
the technical portion of the concept can be established with a small group of similar 
portfolio companies and ISAC technical staff in conjuncture with FBI cyber forensic 
experts and law enforcement officers. This concept can gradually expand to other 
industries and their respective ISACs.  
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To change the current status quo will require leaders to have enough courage to 
move their organizations beyond inertia in regards to cybercrimes and cybersecurity. The 
biggest challenge will be to persuade the leadership of both sectors to participate. They 
are likely to be skeptical of the community policing because the concept has not be 
proven to work. Oakland is an example of a city that attempted to implement community 
policing strategy in its policing. It provided mixed results but its lack of success was due 
to the insufficient investment in placing officers within communities on a long term basis. 
There was insufficient time to build the necessary relationships and trust to create an 
environment to openly communicate.52 Officers that were able to build relationships with 
the community improved the sense of security and cooperation from community 
members to lowered crime rates within the neighborhood.53 Results from the real world 
implementation of community policing need to be analyzed for its return on investment 
by leadership. The program shows potential, but it needs sufficient investment in order 
for potential to be realized.  
There is also the technical challenge of securely transmitting information to the 
ISAC for establishing a normal range of activity and continuous monitoring of abnormal 
activity. It may appear to be a challenge but many companies already contract its security 
through existing cybersecurity firms. ISAC will have to reassure companies that it will 
not inadvertently reveal confidential business information to other member companies.   
The law enforcement lacks a coherent strategy in how cyber incidents are 
investigated and how the work should be divided between government agencies. The FBI 
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is currently the leading agency in charge of policing cybercrimes affecting all US-based 
victims and the Secret Service in charge of financial related cybercrimes. These two law 
enforcement agencies do not have enough agents to investigate all of the cybercrimes 
affecting the private sector. The pooling of activity will allow officers the ability to focus 
on portfolios of companies and also to create a relationship with the group. 
 Even with the successful adoption of the ‘community policing’ practice, there is a  
lack of professionals experienced in the technical and legal areas dealing with 
cybercrimes. ISACs will have to hire a significant number of technical cybersecurity 
professionals experienced in continuous monitoring, analysis, and evidence processing.  
Policy Recommendations 
 In order to implement the concept of ‘community policing’, this paper 
recommends that the one of the larger ISACs specifically the financial services industry 
as the first industry to experiment with the concept. The Financial Services-Information 
Sharing and Analysis Center is the appropriate organization to conduct third party 
analysis of cyber-related activity and act as a conduit to facilitate communication 
between companies and the FBI, Secret Service, and other agencies in cybercriminal 
investigations. It has a large membership base with 4400 member institutions which 
allows the organization to develop a smaller group of similar firms to participate in 
implementing the concept.54  All of the involved organizations will be able to further the 
development of cyber analysis, forensics, evidence processing and storage, and 
prosecution of these criminals. The funding for the project should be jointly funded by 
FIN-ISAC and Department of Homeland Security as an attempt to fulfill EO 13636.  
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The ISAC is currently organized for tiered access with annual membership dues. 
The organization will need to recruit more company members in order to capture enough 
data. In order to increase involvement from larger companies, the Securities Exchange 
Commission need to require publically traded companies to report cyber-related 
incidents. Industry regulators such as Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) 
can encourage companies that are interested in improving cybersecurity, to participate in 
the ISAC. As the SEC further defines and enforce the requirement that public companies 
report cyber-related incidents, it will increase participation from the large companies to 
engage on a proactive basis. The publicity of involvement from large companies will 
generate interest and involvement from SMEs.  
The leadership from the top will have to become more educated in cybersecurity 
in cyberspace. The knowledge will prepare them to manage the complexities of managing 
security from an organizational standpoint. The education will prepare them to answer 
questions from investors and government officials that are inquiring about the 
organization’s strategy for security. If there needs to be an incentive for leadership to 
participate, organizations do not have to look further than Target’s mismanagement of a 
major breach of its payment network. The CEO of Target resigned after much criticism of 
its mismanagement of the response and recovery stemming from the breach.  
Currently, there is already a significant gap in skilled professionals in the 
technical area of these. Law enforcement agencies and prosecutors will need to have 
additional training to understand the technical aspects of cybercrimes and encouraged to 
develop formal policies and procedures in response to the new operating field. The 
National Computer Forensics Institute (affiliated with the Secret Service) would train 
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federal officers and prosecutors about the challenges of dealing with cybercrimes and 
provide them with tools to overcome them.55  
There will also need to be an open and secure line of communication with 
companies and law enforcement to share information. A dedicated database would be 
used to store data such as a baseline activity and evidence gathered from attacks. Cyber 
forensics would analyze the evidence and share the findings with law enforcement. The 
partnerships would share evidence with law enforcement and other national security 
agencies for investigations.  
The ways crimes are committed are ever changing but not the intent. To catch up 
to criminals, agents have to be fluent in the same spaces where the criminals operate. 
Law enforcement will need to show that it will prioritize the needs of the communities 
rather than its own. A first step in focusing on building the important relationships to 
improving perception and reality of improving policing would be hiring agents dedicated 
to training and investigating these types of crimes. 
Conclusion 
The exponential growth of an innately fluid cyberspace has also increased the 
complexity of which companies have to navigate while conducting business. The 
constant change within cyberspace has created as many obstacles as opportunities for 
leadership of both private and public sectors. Current policing has not shown that 
terrestrial policing can be applied to cyberspace due the inability for law enforcement to 
police beyond physical territories. Attempts to bring global order into cyberspace have 
not been successful due to the lack of widespread adoption of treaties focused on 
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Cybercrime can no longer be considered a threat that can be effectivel managed 
on an individual basis, especially for SMEs. SMEs face an outsized investment in 
individually managing the risk. It is a systemic risk that needs systemic management by 
empowering companies to manage the risk in a coherent manner.  Significant 
improvements in policing within cyberspace will help bring some reassurances to 
businesses particularly the numerous SMEs that dominate the real world business 
landscape. Harnessing the power of an entire industry will empower the industry to work 
together to improve the overall security while operating in cyberspace.   
By applying the concept of ‘community policing’ in cyberspace and  separating 
the needs of user groups and focusing on sub user groups such as SMEs, the focus will 
highligh the weaknesses and abilities of the sub-user group such as SMEs. SMEs 
individually are not particularly well equipped to deal with systemic threats of 
cybercrimes. But power of broad industry participation helps increase the awareness of 
systemic threats in cyberspace and the sharing of best practices tailored for companies by 
size and industry subgroup. Large and SMEs will benefit from sharing information and 
hiring third party analysis of unusual cyber activity. It will help law enforcement to focus 
on identifying and arresting suspected criminal hackers and then use the evidence 
gathered by the industry public-private partnership. The concept is not applicable to all 
problems stemming from cybercrimes but it does help further the development of 
cyberspace policing to improve attribution and aid in prosecution of suspected criminal 
hackers.  
The application of “community policing” in cyberspace is a step towards 
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improving policing in cyberspace for businesses and the government. It is a simple 
approach towards one of the many aspects of combatting cybercrime but something easy 
for leaders and the public to understand and participate. Since the concept is arguably 
abiding by the EO 13636, it should get partial funding from the Department of Homeland 
Security. This concept that is technology agnostic and voluntary. It provides a secondary 
but still very active monitoring for companies of all sizes. The initial funding will be a 
sign of confidence in implementing new concepts for policing cyberspace and protecting 
the US’ private sector infrastructure. 
The most important aspect of the community policing is the communication and 
coordination between the leaders of private sectors and the law enforcement. It will be 
the foundation for fostering a productive partnership to respond to serious incidents, 
quickly and efficiently as possible. It also can offer streamlined responses by allowing the 
ISACs coordinate the communication of cyber-related incidents to the appropriate law 
enforcement agency.  
Improvement in security for industries will lead the way to other innovation such 
as securing cyberspace for all user groups. Utilizing the existing resources of industry and 
the federal government will provide a strong foundation for innovation in policing the 
borderless cyberspace. It will take time to make it possible for a secured cyberspace but 
taking small steps like these will help build trust and encourage additional cooperation. 
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Captive Insurance: Providing Cybersecurity Risk Transfer for SMEs 
Introduction 
 The recent rise of data breaches in large publicly traded companies such as T.J. 
Maxx, Neiman Marcus, and Target have shown that companies are encountering cyber 
breaches, despite effort to mitigate such risk.56 Companies managing the recovery from 
such incidents require a good deal of resources in order to respond sufficiently to such 
events. Target one example of a large business that experienced hacking through its point 
of sale machines. The breach through the underbelly of Target’s technology broke the 
trust of consumers and severely damaged the brand reputation. Target re-issued a 
quarterly estimate with a decline of 2.5% in sales compared to flat comparable sales 
before the hacking occurred. 57 The company issued a statement that it planned to make 
an investment of $100 million in security upgrades to its payment system.58 Finally, the 
CEO and Chairman of Target resigned over the poor management of the situation.59 The 
consequences that Target experienced in the aftermath of a serious hacking event despite 
the prior assumptions of compliance shows that planning for such events is vital. 
Consumers, investors, and governments expect companies to have a thorough recovery 
plan for cyber incidents of kinds.  
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The largest US companies are more likely to have established policies, resources, 
and people to respond such incidents. But the majority of the companies operating in the 
US are small and medium enterprises and not all of those companies have the 
proportional access to such resources.60 There is concern whether SMEs can cope with 
the costs of recovering from cyber incidents because it has fewer resources. Target 
experienced an event that influenced its earnings for the quarter and beyond, but it is still 
in business due to its substantial balance sheet; SMEs do not share that kind of luxury. 
The economic loss caused by business interruption in cyberspace or a malicious incident 
can be detrimental to any company; a large company will be able to absorb the costs 
compared to a SME because it will likely have a greater proportional effect on a SME’s 
balance sheet. 
While companies may have access to disparate resources for cyber incidents, there is 
still no assurance that the company has taken sufficient actions to assess its weaknesses 
fully and implemented necessary mitigation for managing cyber risk and comprehensive 
plan to respond to emergencies. Insurance is one of the most useful tools to ensure 
minimal risk management through underwriting requirements and audits of losses 
incurred by insured companies.61  Insurance is a tool used by companies to transfer a 
portion of the risk of operating in cyberspace. It provides financial compensation for the 
insured company to recover some of the economic loss triggered by an incident and funds 
for the company to use for recovery in the aftermath of cyber incidents, malicious or not. 
Depending on the type of insurance it will provide coverage for first and/or third party 
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61 Kirilov, Rosen. "Effectiveness of the Information Security in the Banks."Cybernetics and Information 
Technologies 6, no. 2 (2006). 
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losses. In order to obtain such insurance, companies must complete specific requirements 
in order to qualify for underwriting. Insurance companies will provide guidance on 
expected policies and practices to mitigate as much risk as possible in order for the 
insurance company to accept the unknown risks of the insured company operating in 
cyberspace. 
Traditional insurance coverage is increasingly excluding coverage for cyber- related 
risks.62 The assumption, for most companies, is that traditional insurance will provide 
coverage for those same risks insured for the real world will carry over to cyberspace. 
That is not the case with cyber risks; more insurance companies are explicitly excluding 
cyber/electronic losses in the detailed portion of the insurance policy. The risk has been 
deemed to be substantially different from the currently available actuarial information on 
non-cyber losses.63 Large companies have or will be increasing investments in specific 
cyber- insurance, while SMEs are mostly either relying on current insurance such as 
professional liability (errors & omissions) or general liability insurance to provide 
coverage for cyber-related risks and losses. SMEs that assume existing insurance 
coverage will provide financial compensation for cyber incidents can be an expensive 
mistake. A company that inadvertently invests further in existing insurance without expert 
knowledge that the insurance policy will cover the appropriate risks can further reduce 
the return on investment in the insurance as well reduce the resources spent on recovery. 
Cyber insurance is a burgeoning category within the insurance industry.  It is 
specially designed to provide coverage for direct and indirect, non-tangible losses such as 
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Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2004. 
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confidential data (personal identification information and financial information), 
electronic network technology (i.e. cloud computing), and electronic business 
interruption (caused either by technical error or malicious cyber-crime.) Current 
commercial insurance coverage for cyber-related risks is limited, and custom cyber 
insurance policies are expensive.64  Large enterprises typically have purchased large 
amounts of commercial cyber insurance in addition to tailored insurance, but SMEs do 
not normally purchase it.65 The significant growth in the cyber insurance market is 
increasing the availability of such products to participants, but there are potential issues 
for companies, especially SMEs.  
There are risks to SMEs considering participation in a developing cyber insurance 
market. As insurers receive more premiums, they will also process more claims filed by 
the insured companies. One of the risks with the additional claims filed is the insurance 
company may not find that it is profitable to provide such a service or reject the claim 
outright. Any company that files a claim, especially SMEs, will want an expeditious 
claims process and access to re-insurance will need to consider alternatives to 
commercial cyber insurance. One of the lesser-known alternative that can be used by 
SMEs to create cyber coverage without traditional commercial insurance is through the 
creation of captive insurance companies. Captive insurance is an insurance company 
soley created to insure the parent company or companies. Traditionally this has been 
utilized by large enterprises that had to insure multiple subsidiary business units but did 
not offer any other apparent benefits that would incentivize SMEs to participate. This 
paper asks if captive insurance is a viable solution for SMEs to transfer risk in the 
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immediate future while general commercial cyber insurance market continues its 
development.  
SMEs function under a number of constraints in comparison to large enterprises, 
while considering cyber insurance coverage. The paper will review major constraints that 
fall under these main themes: budget, human capital, and policies. The understanding of 
captive insurance companies as a viable solution is an examination relative to the current 
state of the insurance market. 
This paper consists of six parts. The first part will introduce the literature review and 
essential definitions to understand cyber insurance. The second part of the paper will 
provide an overview of existing role and state of cyber insurance in overall risk 
management for companies operating in cyberspace. The third part of the paper will 
review the roadblocks to developing a mature commercial cyber insurance market. Then 
this paper will examine captive insurance as an alternative to the commercial cyber 
insurance. The fifth part of the paper will explore three examples of companies and their 
respective experiences in managing the cyber-related incident and the role of insurance 
played in each case. In the conclusion, the paper will examine the analysis of the three 
case studies and the importance of risk management for SMEs.  
Literature Review     
This paper examines whether a captive insurance company is a viable solution for 
the immediate future for SMEs. It looks for a solution in the immediate future rather than 
in the future because the market will become more efficient over time. Insurance 
companies will eventually have access to greater quantities of data related to cyber 
incidents that will help calculate accurate pricing for the risk that insurance companies 
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will accept from an insured company. Access to improved actuarial data and increased 
demand for this cyber insurance will help further the development of the market. 
Premium prices for cyber insurance will eventually become more efficient but there are 
no guarantees on the direction of the market as of yet.   
Definitions for Traditional Commercial Insurance 
First party business insurance policies provide financial compensation for direct 
losses or damages to the insured’s property and may provide coverage for lost business 
revenue.66 The insurance applied in a non-cyber context will provide monetary 
compensation for damages to inventory, vital machinery, and factories because of either 
vandalism, theft, destruction from a natural disaster or inoperability.  
 General business liability insurance covers third party losses/injuries occurred on 
the insured company’s assets and property.67 These would be losses incurred neither by 
the insured company nor the insurance company. The insurance will provide 
compensatory damages, nonmonetary losses suffered by the injured party, and punitive 
damages.  
 Errors and omissions (E&O) insurance provides coverage for the failure to 
provide or service provided, to meet the client’s expected results or promised results.68 It 
will cover judgments, settlements, and defense costs. This type of insurance may or may 
not include loss of client data, software or system failure, claims of non-performance. It 
will not include it because electronic losses are considered to be intangible.   
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 Director and Officers Liability- is coverage for directors and executives liability 
while serving the policyholder company in a fiduciary capacity.69 It is very similar to 
E&O insurance, but it is tailored more for the management of a company rather than just 
professionals. This type of insurance will typically include legal expenses and settlements 
for lawsuits brought against executives and companies.  
 The prior definitions for traditional commercial insurance provide 
coverage for a variety of items, but none have explicitly included electronic data, 
electronic/virtual systems, losses due to unexpected disruptions in electronic systems. 
While it can be argued that it should cover liability in cyberspace, the lack of explicit 
inclusion has allowed insurance companies to deny claims filed by insured companies. 
Lawsuits initiated by policyholders against insurance companies have not been successful 
such as the case of Zurich America and Zurich Insurance versus Sony in its 2011 highly 
publicized data breach of its PlayStation Network.70 The insurers were able to absolve 
themselves of providing financial compensation to Sony because the general liability 
insurance did not explicitly include third party theft of personal information.  
Cyber Insurance as a Risk Management Tool 
There are typically four approaches in risk management while treating known risks- 
avoidance, mitigation, transfer, and acceptance.71 Some have argued that finding an 
optimal risk management strategy should focus on the economically optimal solution 
rather than the potential technical loss that leads to greater understanding from business 
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leaders.72  Determining the optimal solution requires the application of certain standards 
such as NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) or ISAME (Information 
Assurance for SMEs) in order to scrutinize the information security systems and its risks 
without the intense investment as ISO 27001.73 Such assessments will provide a vital 
starting point for SMEs to be aware of the capabilities of existing security systems and 
areas of improvement to mitigate risk. Policies and procedures for operating in 
cyberspace will mitigate some of the risks. Companies will then create contingency plans 
that will include incident response plans, disaster recovery plan, and business continuity 
plan that will address potential events that include cyber-related incidents.74 Companies 
operating in cyberspace have already accepted some form of risk. Obviously the risk 
accepted is less than the benefits derived from operating in cyberspace. Those companies 
that wish to avoid the risk of operating in cyberspace may not be active participants but 
will encounter third party risk by interacting with other stakeholders who are operating in 
cyberspace.75 Finally, some companies willing and able to transfer cyber risk to an 
insurance company. 76 The necessary insurance can be decided after modeling the 
probability of certain scenarios and potential losses. While direct losses would be 
obvious, for SMEs, business leaders would have to devise a way of calculating indirect 
losses associated with the risks identified with their business.   
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Risk avoidance and risk mitigation can appear to be the preferred tactics, but risk 
transfer can benefit an organization’s for managing unexpected, detrimental events that 
may not have previously established thorough planning. Insurance is effect tool in driving 
business leaders to engage in risk mitigation for all risks including cyber.77 Some 
business leaders may not believe the investment in the insurance is necessary after the 
conducting the assessment. But the the exercise of examining whether insurance is 
necessary is beneficial for business leaders to gain a measured understanding of 
weaknesses within a framework of existing standards. Those that recognize that insurance 
is a necessity will create a mitigation plan and invest in insurance to cover the potential 
shortfall if the company experiences an event that causes losses.  
Commercial Cyber Insurance 
Most companies lack proper risk management strategy much less cyber insurance. 
However, even those with sufficient traditional commercial insurance may find that 
existing policies with exclusions that would cover such incidents. Cyber insurance can be 
a useful tool to initiate the overall strategy in managing cyberspace risks for many SMEs. 
It will also force companies that did not previously formulate policies for securing 
confidential information, internal user policies, IT security including policies for securing 
personal mobile devices used for work, and data storage redundancy. It also gives the 
ability for companies to contemplate the role of technology in the business. The 
technology is now becoming agiler with storage in the cloud, and devices that benefit 
from the data interconnectedness more commonly known as the Internet of Things.78 The 
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cost of the insurance premium will be dependent on the insurance company’s willingness 
to accept a portion of the insured’s unknown risk of liability in cyberspace. Companies 
will be intrinsically incentivized to invest in risk mitigation in order to lower the 
premium.79 The insurance policy will also provide a way for the company to exchange 
uncertain costs of potential losses in the future for present costs. It helps control costs for 
budgeting of certain scenarios. Insurance provides cost control by the design of adoption 
and implementation of best practices. 
The cyber insurance sub-industry currently has a number of distinct categories of 
coverage. It is unique because it provides explicit coverage that was previously not 
included in traditional commercial insurance. The loss covered will usually fall under 
direct and indirect losses similar to traditional insurance but the assets covered under 
cyber insurance will focus on electronic data, hardware, and cyber specific events. The 
coverage may include the loss and/or expenses related to business/service interruption, 
reinstatement of data and its security, electronic data assets managed by network 
technology, forensic services, litigation and settlement, and regulatory fines. This kind of 
insurance coverage is bridging an important gap within traditional insurance coverage for 
companies.  
One of the emerging products within cyber insurance is cyber liability insurance. It 
can provide coverage for intangible losses from data breaches, denial of service, and 
interruption of service. It can provide financial compensation for technical services, 
forensics, notification, legal, regulatory, and administrative expenses related to incident 
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response.80 It is important because companies are required to report a breach to 
consumers, in 46 out of 50 states.81 Depending on the insurance company offering this 
type of insurance, it may include coverage related to third-party supply chain risk and 
intellectual property.82 This form of commercial insurance is still under development, but 
demand is growing for this type of product. While it is under development, there are also 
significant gaps in actuarial data to accurate price such form of risks. These deficiencies 
for cyber liability insurance are representative of the market itself.       
Current commercial insurance policies for cybersecurity risks offer limited 
coverage while tailored commercial insurance policies are expensive for most companies. 
There are a few areas that insurance cover such as insurance to cover direct losses and 
liability for third party damages. Commercially available cyber insurance is either very 
expensive or limited coverage because of the lack of actuarial data or knowledge about 
the coverage. 17 carriers provide cybersecurity insurance policies today. Only five or six 
of those carriers are willing to develop “manuscripted” policies – custom-drafted from 
scratch.83 While custom-drafted, it may include negotiations between the insured 
company and the insurance company to include certain coverage on riskier line such as 
direct losses. These policies tend to skew in favor of large enterprises with large budgets 
in order to afford highly customized insurance.  
SMEs and Cyber Insurance 
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While companies should consider the inclusion of cyber insurance, there are some 
issues with demand from SMEs. There are several factors as to why most of SMEs lack 
proper cyber insurance. Many SME owners and employees do not have experience or 
working knowledge of technology or security required to maintain a secure working 
environment. In a National Cyber Security Alliance and Symantec survey of 1,015 SMEs 
(250 employees or less) in the United States, 11% of those surveyed said no one is 
responsible for cybersecurity at the business; 66% say the business owners/operators are 
responsible; 9% rely on an IT savvy employee and 8% use an outside IT 
consultant.84  The lack of knowledgeable individuals in SMEs also will also often 
indicate a lack policies and tools such as insurance to respond to cyber incidents such as 
the Target case. 83% of the same respondents said that the company did not have formal 
Internet security policy. It is apparent the lack of involvement by executives will deprive 
interest in developing a coherent risk management strategy for unexpected cyber-
incidents.  
Most SMEs lack of budget to afford such product as the current cost of existing 
cyber insurance for first party losses. Most of the available cyber insurance for first party 
losses is expensive due to lack of actuarial data. First party losses are losses directly 
incurred by the insured. Finally, most SMEs assume that existing insurance will cover the 
company’s cyber-related incidents when in reality it may not due to exclusions in 
traditional commercial insurance. 
Despite the fact that such a large number of SMEs lack cyber insurance, they are 
also the group most at risk. Verizon reported in 2011 that 72% of 855 data breaches 




around the world targeted at companies with less than 100 employees.85 It was a 62% rise 
in data breaches focused on SMEs from 2010. Small and medium sized enterprises 
(SME) are vulnerable to data breaches and other internal and external cybersecurity risks 
such as network disruption, insider threat, denial of service attacks, physical damage or 
loss of data, or malware, or corporate espionage. The lack of knowledgeable individuals 
to manage the risk of operating in cyberspace can lead to a lack of awareness of the 
necessary tools to protect itself. Many SMEs will utilize generic security tools that are 
vulnerable to exploitation if the hacker has already uncovered them.  Depending on the 
cost of the incident response plus the intrinsic value of the data that was affected, a cyber-
incident can be devastating for a SME. The consequences of these risks can lead to a 
disruption in operations, failure to fulfill contractual obligations, and loss of third party 
information. 
Commercial Cyber Insurance Insufficient for SMEs 
Cyber insurance is a growing and popular sub-sector with within the industry. The 
insurance industry as a whole is not known to be dynamic. Insurance designed for mass 
use was carefully calculated to anticipate the amount of acceptable losses as understood 
under the law of large numbers. It is one that is naturally conservative in its development 
of products that will accept unexpected but quantifiable risk from others. There is interest 
in developing products to provide a variety of coverage for cyber-related incidents. 
However, there are also barriers to creating a comprehensive availability of commercial 
insurance such a lack of a third party market to cover losses that are associated to cyber-
related incidents.  
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There is an ongoing debate on the role of the government in managing cyber 
insurance risk. It is frequently compared to terrorism insurance because these are high-
value catastrophic events for companies and government entities. Terrorism insurance 
faces the same issue of re-insurance. The Terrorism Insurance Act that provides the 
“backstop” funding for commercial insurance requires extensions approved by 
Congress.86 The Act has been extended by Congress in 2005, 2007, and 2015.87 The most 
recent extension was only made after a few days of the prior legislation expired. It led to 
the expiration 750,000 private insurance policies after December 31, 2014 because the 
policies stated that the government had to provide the financial backstop to such 
policies.88 While Congress eventually passed the renewal for such legislation, it 
highlights the fragile nature of the government willingness to provide such an important 
backstop. Some have made comparisons of cyber insurance to terrorism insurance with 
the proposal that the government provides a similar backstop to cyber insurance for major 
catastrophic events.89 It reinforces the precarious nature of commercial insurance for 
companies because it policies explicit reliance on government reinsurance.   
The actuarial information related to cyber insurance policies is under development. 
There is no standard access for such information since not all companies are legally 
required to report such incidents governmental entities. The current corporate culture 
does not encourage sharing. Public companies are now experiencing pressure to share 
information, but they are only starting disclose information due to regulatory rules. 
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Privately held companies are not held to the same standards and are likely not to share 
information voluntarily due to a combination of legal, reputational, additional security 
risks, and financial risks.90 The lack of such information makes it difficult accurately to 
price the risk associated with cyber risk. Insurance companies are forging ahead without 
such information while knowing that one catastrophic event may financially overwhelm 
the company before the market is developed.     
These significant barriers on the supply side will take a long time to overcome as it 
did with other areas of insurance. While it will take time to create overcome these issues 
to provide accurately priced commercial cyber insurance to companies of all sizes, there 
is no doubt that demand will continue to grow. With more and more public companies are 
publically disclosing events and making significant investments in risk management, this 
will encourage SMEs to consider additional investment in security investments. While 
the demand from SMEs continues to develop for commercial cyber insurance, SMEs that 
need a solution that can solve the problem of risk transfer in the immediate future. SMEs 
that are reliant on number of suppliers and has significant amounts of sensitive data 
should consider cyber insurance but also insurance that is not at risk of overly relying on 
Congressional legislation and a quick claim process.  
A novel option that has not been widely promoted to SMEs is captive insurance. 
Captive insurance is an insurance company established by a non-insurance parent 
company or group of companies to finance its individual risks.91 It is a form of self-
insurance against any number of risks associated to the insured. This tool has been used 
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by many large corporations as one of its options to transfer risk. SMEs may not realize 
that they can also take advantage of the tool and receive a US tax benefit assuming its 
premium payments do not exceed IRS limits. There will be a considerable wait for the 
development of commercial cyber insurance for many SMEs while access to create an 
individual insurance company that will provide custom coverage specific to its needs 
including all applicable cybersecurity risks. 
The adoption of captive insurance to provide custom cyber insurance coverage 
would be a stop-gap measure until there is a mature market to accurately price insurance 
and provide coverage that will not change due to legislation or inaccurate actuarial 
information. It is a tool that will attract attention from owners and executives in SMEs. It 
provides a variety of benefits of controlling the claims process, substantial tax benefits, 
and intrinsic incentive to improve cyber security within the firm.  
Captive insurance is a closely held insurance company owned and controlled by 
the insured or various insured companies. It provides flexibility that insured companies 
that commercial insurance policies cannot provide. Creating a captive insurance company 
allows the insured company to determine its own loss requirements, make tax deductible 
premium payments to the captive insurance, access reinsurance market for cheaper 
premiums, and build its own separate budget for increased ability to address risk 
control.92  Companies that are large enough can form its own insurance companies can 
remove the chance of moral hazard. Smaller companies will have to pool their risk 
together in mutual captive insurance. It may risk moral hazard, but the captive company 
will have to share the risk with a specific number of other captives if the captive wants 
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the IRS approval. This concept of cyber insurance is in its early stages but for some it 
may be a feasible idea because of the ability for the insured company to have control over 
the risk transfer. 
Captive Insurance Companies 
Captive insurance is an alternative form of insurance that is wholly owned and 
operated by the insured company or group of companies. There is a variety of captive 
insurance companies such as single-parent, group captive, association captive, rent-a-
captive- and risk retention group.93 This type of insurance company was traditionally 
utilized in times when commercial insurance was expensive and difficulty in obtaining 
certain types of desired insurance coverage. While the formation of a captive is a 
subsidiary to the insured, it is a legally formed company with a legitimate business plan 
to insure legitimate risks. The size of the captive insurance companies size is not 
restricted. While large holding companies tend to create captive insurance for its 
subsidiary companies, SMEs can also form its own captive insurance company. Small 
captives will have to have at least half of its premium pooled with other companies that 
share a similar risk. Zhao and Xue support the concept of captive insurance companies to 
streamline IT compliance management but while the authors support the arguments in 
favor of captive insurance, it does not offer clear reasons how SMEs would benefit from 
creating a captive insurance.94 Schwarcz and Schwarcz point out the cumulative effect of 
insurance companies including captive insurance companies can create systemic risk.95 
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There was not much scholarly research in the area directly related to captive insurance 
and cyber risk.  
SMEs that wish to participate or form a captive insurance company can create a 
captive insurance company with additional tax benefits listed under Sec. 831(b.) Property 
and casualty insurance company that receives a gross premium income of $1.2 MM or 
less can elect that it can legally avoid tax on its premium income and only taxes on the 
income derived from the investment income.96 The election for taxation only on the 
investment income is irrevocable without the IRS’s consent, but it is automatically 
terminated if the gross premium income exceeds the section limit.97 It allows the insured 
companies to reduce the amount of taxes by deducting the premium payment, and the 
captive insurance will be taxed on the investment income instead of the underwriting 
income received. For example, assuming a captive insurance company with the 831(b) 
designation received a premium of $500,000, and all of it is invested in a conservative 
investment yielding 4%. The captive insurance would be responsible for $20,000; the 
taxable amount of the investment income, compared to the typical amount of $500,000 of 
the premium received, that would have been identified as taxable without the special 
designation. Other insurance companies will have to pay taxes on the total premium 
received. It is a substantial tax benefit for companies that wish to control the risk transfer 
from the parent company. 
The small captive insurance companies are also required to diversify the risk. The 
IRS Ruling 2002-89 stated that the captive insurance companies that receives 90% plus 
of premiums and if the parent company that owns over 90% of the captive insurance 
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company means that there has not been enough risk shifted from the parent company. 
The ruling further clarified that if the risk of the parent company was less than 50% of the 
captive insurance company’s total risk and premiums received, that it would be a 
qualified tax deduction.98  Further Ruling 2002-90 stated that domestic holding 
companies with 12 operating subsidiaries with similar but independent risks, if each 
subsidiary that has a minimum of 5% but no more than 15% of the total risk insured 
would also make insurance premiums paid a qualified tax deductions.99 These two rulings 
were significant in clarifying the quantity of risk transfer from the captive insurance 
companies to re-insurance. In order to achieve the desired result of alternative taxation 
structure of the smaller captive and also making the insurance premiums deductible for 
the parent company.  
There are a few other incentives that make captive an appealing option to SMEs 
currently interested in covering its cyber risks. The captive company can provide 
coverage on any legitimate risks that the insured parent company that is necessary. It can 
either provide primary or secondary coverage if the company already owns existing 
commercial insurance existing risks. The captive company can incentivize the insured 
parent company to implement better practices to mitigate risks including those while 
operating in cyberspace.100 Its intrinsic incentive is that improved mitigation will lower 
the chances of processing claims and paying out funds. The captive insurance company 
can invest the premium paid into the company. The insurance company will have to pay 
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taxes on any investment income earned, but it will be at a lower rate if the gains are 
counted as long-term capital gain. The premiums paid into the captive insurance 
company can also be used to purchase re-insurance. Re-insurance is insurance purchased 
by insurance companies to transfer risk to one or more insurance companies.101 It allows 
additional diversification in the in the risk that has been transferred by insured companies 
to the insurance companies. Finally, the captive insurance company can provide an easier 
and expedited claim process. 
Shetty, Schwartz, Felegyhazi, and Walrand argue that cyber insurance does not 
improve security.102 This paper disagrees that insurance will not improve security. The 
captive insurance company can positively impact the bottom line of the parent company 
because net profits from the captive insurance company can return to the parent company. 
The parent company/insured is incentivized to not make claims. The way to not submit 
claims is to improve the security. To create a legitimate captive insurance requires that 
the captive insurance company adequately analyze and price the risk of the parent 
company. If the company does not take appropriate mitigation to have competitive 
pricing for its cyber risks, it may bring unwanted attention from the IRS for potential 
fraud.  
 Case Studies 
This paper will examine three companies in the context of cyber insurance in 
cyber-related incidents. Two of the case studies that presented are ones that involve major 
companies. While two of these cases involve well-known companies with substantial 
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resources, it will provide insight in how insurance is utilized after encountering cyber-
related incidents. It will also provide some insight on how companies with proper and 
improper coverage can affect the outcome of resolving data breaches or other incidents. 
The third case study is one that involved a small private company that did not have any 
insurance that experienced an electronic theft from its bank accounts. 
In 2011, Sony unexpectedly shut down Play Station and Qriocity in response to a 
major data breach. Malicious hackers accessed up more than 77 million records of user’s 
account names, e-mail addresses, passwords, and credit card information.103  Hackers 
also breached the other areas of Sony’s Online Entertainment gaming website. Sony was 
notified of the intrusion on April 19th but did not send data breach notification emails to 
users until a week later. The Playstation Network had to be shut down and completely 
rebuilt. Sony’s insurance companies that provided general liability insurance to the 
company immediately filed a claim in court. The insurance companies stated that it was 
not liable to provide legal defense for the third-party lawsuits from the users because the 
data breach because it was a third party breach not related to the insurance that was to be 
provided by the insurer. The class action lawsuits brought on by the users were based on 
Sony’s inability to protect the information and the delay in notifying the users. Sony 
eventually dropped the lawsuit against Great American Insurance CO. of New York and 
lost approximately $25 million that it attempted to claim for the incident.    
Sony experienced a very unfortunately event when it discovered that its  
commercial insurance had very strict qualifications for accepting claims, despite the size 
of the company. It lost significant money, double-fold because the money that was set 
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aside for insurance did not provide financial compensation when it was expected to by 
the insured company. Instead, Sony will have to pay approximately $171 million in 
recovery costs and make further investments in its security.104 While the amount did not 
financially bankrupt Sony because it is such a large global company, it reduced quarterly 
earnings and profits. Sony reported the hacking incident in its first quarter 2011 
performance earnings report.105 Public corporations are required to report these events on 
these reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission when the corporation finds that 
the event will or has had an adverse effect on earnings. It highlights that the largest 
companies are still struggling to comprehend completely and manage insurance policies. 
Companies, especially SMEs, are trying to find a balance between the initial cost and 
flexibility of insurance policies. Commercial insurance companies are very proactive on 
what it will or will not provide coverage. In Sony’s case, insurance companies will 
proactively protect their interests and not necessarily the interest of the insured company.     
In another recently publicized case, US retail store Target was the victim of a 
significant data breach sometime between November 27 and December 18, 2013. The 
intruders illegally accessed the point of sale software and potentially stole up to 40 
million users’ credit and debit card information plus 70 million users’ personally 
identifiable information such as addresses, email addresses, and phone numbers. Target’s 
insurers will have to settle stolen personal information and credit card claims from tens of 
millions of shoppers who purchased from the store during that time frame.106 It was later 
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reported that the retail store chain had over $100 million dollars of cyber insurance 
coverage through $10 million of self-insurance and various layers of commercial 
insurance by Axis Capital Holdings Ltd, American International Group, and four other 
unidentified insurers.107 It is one of the few cybersecurity cases that highlighted a 
company possessing a significant amount of insurance for cybersecurity breaches. 
The cost of Target’s data breach and consequential activities was significant. 
Target has stated that consumers who were affected by the breach would not be 
responsible for any fraudulent charges and all customers who shopped at Target would 
receive one free year of credit monitoring. The cost of the investigation and other 
incident-related activities, as reported in the 4th quarter earnings for Target, came to $61 
million before taxes, $44 million of which will be offset by insurance payments.108 The 
company was unable to estimate future expenses related to the data breach. Those costs  
may include fraudulent payments associated with potential claims by credit card 
companies and card re-issuance costs; costs associated with litigation, investigative and 
consulting fees; capital investments for remediation activities.109  These future costs may 
have material adverse effect on Target’s net earnings for 2014 and in the future. It was a 
company that had some insurance for transferring its cyber risk, but it showed a  lack of a 
recovery planing even though Target may have appeared to be in compliance with its risk 
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mitigation. The point is especially obvious when the CEO of Target resigned over the 
poor response by the company to the data breach.110   
Companies like Sony and Target have financial resources that can maintain 
financial solvency but smaller companies may not. Companies that especially have large 
databases of personal identifiable information and financial information are specially 
vulnerable. Companies face complex issues that may be familiar with the insurance 
companies but not well understood by the public. The lack of transparency in a 
relationship between commercial insurers and insureds show that the insurance 
companies are likely to benefit from the appearance of offering the necessary coverage. 
When in reality it will reject claims if it does not fulfill every requirement as listed in the 
written contract. Companies that are proactive in cyber risk mitigation should be 
financially rewarded compared to companies that are only compliant with broad 
compliance standards.  
This type of risk can be devastating for smaller companies, but few incidents are 
pulically reported. One of the rare cases publicized in the Wall Street Journal, in 2012, 
involved a very small business, a mannequin maker and importer, Lifestyle Forms & 
Displays Inc. The company has annual revenue of $500,000 to $1,000,000 and 100 
employees.111 The company had $1.2 million stolen from its bank accounts in hours 
through nine online transactions.112 A problem was only apparent when the head of the 
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finance department was unable to login to the company’s banking website. The bank 
denied any issues with its website, Keilson’s three-person IT team decided that the 
company was hit by a virus, despite having up to date anti- virus software, and worked on 
the clean-up. The FBI and the New York Police Department visited the company’s 
headquarters to investigate, but there were no follow-up attempts by either organization. 
After fifteen days of the owner persistently contacting the various banks and its 
executives to get assistance, the company was able to recover $1.04m of the stolen 
money. The company was extremely fortunate in retrieving the majority of money in two 
weeks, but the WSJ did not report if company did not have insurance to cover such 
unexpected risks. The company was large enough to have a small IT team but it did not 
have experience in dealing with malicious attacks and communication with third-party 
service providers such as banks, or law enforcement in these high pressure situations.  
While the amount of actual money stolen out of the account did not cause long-term 
financial damage, the economic cost was significant if one considers the cumulative time 
and resources of Keilson and his staff shifted away from normal operations in order to 
recover the stolen money. There can be endless scenarios like the one just discussed, but 
the incidents can vary in its damage to the victim company. Depending on the timing of 
these attacks, if money was stolen before payroll was deducted from the operating 
accounts; it could have an direct and adverse affect on the cashflow. Smaller companies 
that do not have a team to respond to such events are unlikely to have people who have a 
technical background or even knowledge of whom to reach out in the events like these. 
The resources available on the Internet provides a broad range of guidance for companies 
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but it lacks the clarity necessary for companies attempting to manage a crisis as apparent 
for the mannequin maker. 
Conclusion 
One of the tools to provide guidance to a comprehensive risk management strategy 
is through cyber insurance. It is a growing field within the insurance industry because 
existing insurance to cover liability does not explicitly provide coverage for losses related 
to digital assets and losses caused by cyber-related incidents. Data is the new currency in 
the information economy. This category of insurance will continue to gain traction 
because companies of all sizes are increasingly relying on technology to conduct 
business. 
Cyber insurance will continue to attract interest as media publicize attention on 
public companies that experience cyber-related incidents. As awareness grows, the tools 
deployed in these instances need to become nuanced because there is no perfect cyber 
solution for companies. Even the largest companies with the deep pockets and 
departments dedicated to information security have not properly responded to cyber-
related incidents. Companies like Target and Sony have lost millions, and at least one top 
executive has lost their jobs as a consequence of poor response to major cyber breaches. 
Smaller companies do not have the luxury that large corporations have with large 
operating accounts and lines of credit to absorb losses. The consequences are potentially 
dire for SMEs that do not have resources or individuals to rely on to properly managed 
unexpected and potentially debilitating incident affecting the daily operations. 
Small and medium enterprises face disproportionate challenges in managing its 
cyber risk. SMEs have much less financial resources and adequate human capital to 
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address risk management because it can be viewed secondary to revenue generating 
activities. It is increasingly necessary because the government has not provided clarity on 
what the government will provide in these scenarios and putting the onus on the private 
sector to develop resources to address cyber risk management. Stakeholders such as 
consumers and investors will increasingly demand that companies are sufficiently 
addressing cyber risk through a thoughtful risk management strategy. The resources for 
SMEs to create a comprehensive risk management strategy to address cyber risks are 
disparate and not necessarily the easiest to understand. 
This paper argues that SMEs that are considering incorporating cyber insurance 
should consider the captive insurance company as the vehicle to provide broad coverage 
for its liability in cyberspace. The creation of a captive insurance company for SMEs 
provides the type of control and inherent financial incentive for companies that have 
insurance be a necessity for transferring some of the risks of operating in cyberspace. 
Since the parent company is insuring itself, the company will be incentivized to mitigate 
as much risk as possible and create an adequate response, and recovery plan that will 
perform in the event of the unexpected loss.  
The creation of a captive insurance company provides a financial incentive for 
parent companies if they obtain the IRS designation of 831 (b) for its captive company. It 
changes the taxation that is traditionally on the total amount of premium received by only 
taxation on the investment income. The insurance premium paid by the company will 
also be tax deductible. The parent company now has money that can be used for 
reinsurance to provide additional coverage. The combination of the alternative taxation of 
investment income compared to premium received can be potentially be substantial to a 
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small company with other benefits that include financial incentive to improve its internal 
cybersecurity. 
The most compelling strength of the captive insurance company is that the actual 
claims process will be efficient and most likely to be beneficial to the insured company. 
Unlike commercial insurers that will proactively defend its interest against insured 
companies such as Sony, captive insurance companies are subsidiaries of the parent 
company. The parent company can draft language that will enable the insured parent 
company to access the money in the event of a qualified loss. Commercial insurers have 
not necessarily shown that it will be as amenable as a captive insurance. In cyberspace, 
the future is unknown with cyber-related losses as the technology and assets evolve. 
SMEs that wish to have control over the uncertainty of insurance coverage for cyber-
related risk may find it appropriate to its needs.   
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Cyber Hygiene in Cyberspace 
Introduction  
The best network security system, electronic or otherwise, is only as strong as 
their weakest link, usually humans. However, the natural tendency of most end users is to 
go against best practices or even common sense when it comes to security. Large and 
small companies have to manage external threats, but even the best risk management 
plans may overlook something as simple as managing the behavior of the end-users. In 
early 2011, the Department of Homeland Security tested to see how many people would 
plug in a memory stick or install a computer disc randomly found outside on the ground 
by nearby government buildings. They found that 60% of the memory sticks and CDs 
were inserted into work computers, and this number increased to 90% when the memory 
stick or CD case had a government logo.113 This case out of many reinforces fears about 
negligent insider threats but offers little on how to change or properly manage the 
behavior of end-users of computer networks.   
This paper will focus on a relatively new concept called “cyber hygiene,” which 
aims to explore the ways one might mitigate infiltration of computer networks by way of 
taking advantage of end-users’ propensities. The concept of cyber hygiene could enhance 
cybersecurity by incorporation of managing end-user behavior rather than over-reliance 
on automated technology. Small and seemingly insignificant prudent activities by 
individual end-users could increase the difficulty and amount of time that attackers spend 
on infiltration. The additional difficulty of infiltrating a system will mitigate the threat 
posed by criminal hackers. Improving the security through individual end-user will also 
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improve the overall security and the integrity of company networks. 
Small medium size enterprises face an outsized penalty for not including cyber 
hygiene in its risk management strategy. It is a strategic area of security that does not 
necessarily require substantial investments in technology, it requires focus on designing 
or re-designing security that takes user propensity into account when mitigating risk such 
as restricting the number of users with administrator access, and retraining users to 
become more situationally aware of potential threats from criminal hackers attempting to 
access the network through stealing their personal information. Cyber hygiene has 
potential to empower SMEs to take pro-active steps to improving security and confidence 
of end-users without necessarily investing significant sums of money. 
This paper asks the following question: could the application of the concept 
“cyber hygiene” to a cybersecurity strategy improve the effectiveness of addressing 
known electronic vulnerabilities of  network’s security for SME? The paper consists of 
four parts. The first part will present a survey of the existing research on human behavior 
in the context of cybersecurity. The second part will examine the current public literature 
of federal agencies and defense contractors. The third part will propose a definition of 
cyber hygiene. The fourth part is the conclusions and recommendations for future 
research. 
Literature Review 
 When searching for literature on humans in the context of cybersecurity the 
majority of the available research focused on insider threats, particularly the prediction, 
monitoring, and detection of malicious insider users. The available research reflects the 
opinion of the vast majority of the research’s focus on the stakeholders or the technology 
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involved in cybersecurity. 
Frank Greitzer of the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory regularly publishes  
on insider threats in cybersecurity. He defines insider threats as malicious acts carried out 
by trusted insiders that may benefit the individual but cause harm to the organization. 
Greitzer argues that there should be more innovative training solutions such as 
specialized education and awareness workshops and gaming to combat insider threats. 114 
It would become approachable while users learn the necessary skills to improve 
awareness. He also researches the prediction of insider threats and concludes that there 
should be a framework for predicting possible malicious exploits that uses psychosocial 
indicators to monitor human behavior in addition to existing cyber indicators of potential 
abuse of network resources. Some indicators may be observed directly, such as excessive 
attempts to access a privileged database or running unauthorized software, while others 
would be inferred or derived from observed data such as registry entries, IDS/IPS events, 
and firewall logs. Greitzer recommends there should be further research in defining 
possible precursors of observable cyber and psychosocial indicators, but also 
acknowledges that it would be a challenge. 115 Psychosocial behaviors related to anger 
management, stress, or behavior related to arguments with co-workers or management are 
something to be noted by managers.  It is easier to observe the outliers in excessive 
attempts to access privileged databases, downloading unauthorized software, and unusual 
printing patterns. But it is not necessarily enough evidence to indicate a malicious 
behavior without some contextual understanding of psychosocial indicators of the 
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individual as well.  
 Another interesting piece of research related to managing human behavior comes 
from Ryan West, who focuses on the psychology of end-users in how they evaluate and 
make decisions regarding security. West finds that the best-designed interface does not 
improve network security if users ignore warnings, choose poor settings, or 
unintentionally subvert corporate policies.116 He argues that there would be more end-
user compliance if security system designers created strategies that utilize the 
psychological principles driving behavior. 117 This concept relies heavily on security 
software developers to have a high understanding of human-computer interaction and/or 
user experience development when most focus on automated algorithms and databases of 
existing viruses. It will take time to develop software or redesign existing software that is 
not likely to happen in the immediate future. It does not necessarily solve the immediate 
problem of mitigating end-user security for SMEs. 
 James Lewis of CSIS wrote one research piece that specifically addresses cyber 
hygiene without utilizing the term. Lewis shows that 80 to 90 percent of successful 
breaches of corporate networks required only basic hacking techniques. It also took 85 
percent over months to discover such breaches with an average length of five months for 
such breaches. Australia’s Defense Signals Directorate (DSD) and the US National 
Security Agency independently surveyed the techniques used to penetrate networks 
successfully. The DSD discovered that four risk reduction measures blocked most attacks. 
Agencies and companies implanting these measures saw risk fall by 85% and, in some 
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cases, to zero.118  The four measures were “whitelisting”, which limits only authorized 
software to run on a computer or network; real-time patching of programs such as PDF 
readers, Microsoft Office, and web browsers; real-time patching of operating system 
vulnerabilities such as Microsoft’s Windows, Linux, and Apple’s OS; and minimizing the 
number of people on a network with administrator privileges.119 It clearly identifies that 
the entry point for penetration is through simple methods, and the success rate merely 
depends on the hackers’ patience and ability to apply such attacks.  
 To better manage end-user behavior, a number of researchers have proposed 
methods for measuring and reducing the vulnerability of networked control systems, 
especially industrial systems such as SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data 
Acquisition), as the starting point for raising the vulnerability threshold. One method 
recommends surveying key employees involved in the operation and security of control 
networks and equipment, which would provide a foundation of understanding of which 
employees are familiar with compliance and security policies. It is something that can be 
done internally without the additional investment with outside consultants or auditors.  
Another widely mentioned alternative is building network systems that remain 
resilient after an intrusion or an outright attack. Researchers have looked at resiliency as a 
means of creating and strengthening information systems and organizations to withstand 
physical and electronic threats caused by hackers. Information technology resilience 
focuses on stability and quality of service in the face of constant threats to the networking 
infrastructure. “A resilient control system is one that maintains state awareness and an 
accepted level of operational normalcy in response to disturbances, including threats of 
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an unexpected and malicious nature.” 120 Such resiliency is achieved by fostering 
individual, community, and system robustness, as well as enhancing adaptability and the 
capacity for rapid response and recovery.  
One of the more specific recommendations for deterring malicious actors is to 
modify the feedback control loop, which provides monitoring and control capabilities. 
Data fusion is a method to concentrate or combine data to yield information, and the data 
loop is realized when humans fuse data together. As such, if there are specific responses 
from data fusion, an attacker could reverse-engineer the process to understand the system. 
Therefore, it is beneficial to increase the amount of confusion in a control system to 
reduce an attacker’s ability to manipulate it. 121  
Vince Cerf, known as one of the fathers of the Internet, published a brief 
commentary on the philosophical aspect of cybersecurity. He acknowledges that the 
technical solution is impossible to rely on entirely to resolve cybersecurity and reliance 
on detection and punishment present ethical issues. 122  Instead, he  presents a three-prong 
approach to deal with cyberattacks and other harmful activity in cyberspace: 1) use 
technology to inhibit harm; 2) seek to detect and identify harmful actors and take 
mitigating, including legal, action; 3) use moral-suasion when all else fails.123 He 
specifically recommends that within moral-suasion, there should be motivators for users 
that practice good cyber hygiene. Cyber hygiene implemented by policy and training 
should reduce cyber insurance premiums because the insured had taken precautionary 
measures to mitigate risk. Parties that make that kind of commitments should be 
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rewarded assuming, they are trustworty or can substantiate their commitments.124 He 
broadly points to economic incentives to promote the incorporation of cyber hygiene and 
did not elaborate further on other possible incentives. The example of using reduced 
insurance premium is a relavant example because cyber insurance market is growing with 
companies of all sizes. Examples of good cyber hygiene by Cerf 1) non-reusable 
passwords such as cryptographically generated passwords.125 These one-time passwords 
are generated by hardware tokens. One of the most well-known tokens is the RSA 
SecurID; these are the ubiquitous fobs found on the key chains belonging to many 
corporate and government employees. 2) introduction of the Domain Name System 
Security technology to improve the integrity of mapping domain names to Internet 
Protocol addresses.126  While most Internet users are familiar with domain names that end 
such as ‘.com, .gov, .org’ these domains only lead into the actual IP address to the 
website. Moreover, the domains do not always correspond to numerical addresses 
assigned to users by Internet service providers. The lack of transparency between the 
domain names and IP address enables malicious actors to mask their true identity. 3) open 
source software with the expectation that many would identify and repair 
vulnerabilities.127 Cerf agreed that one was debatable because of the assumption of the 
good will and devotion to the use of the open source software. Wikipedia is an example 
of open-source collaborative encyclopedia that has a high participation in identifying and 
correcting incorrect entries quickly. It is not impossible, but it would require significant 
user adoption.  Moral suasion is best helped by the transparency of open-source 











collaboration between actors in cyberspace.  
Other researchers make references to the phrase cyber hygiene but do not go into 
depth in specifically in defining or analyzing cyber hygiene. Some researchers referenced 
instituting cyber hygiene education initiatives.128 One of the minority research pieces 
stated that over 80% of attacks can be dealt with through basic cyber hygiene, such as 
patches, passwords, anti-malware, and firewalls.129 Even when these tools are put in place 
if regular maintenance avoided then those tools becomes useless. The authors do not 
substantiate the percentage in the book. It does voice support for promoting a culture of 
cyber hygiene and vigilance, with people and organizations following security policies, 
using strong passwords, regularly applying security patches would make attackers’ work 
more difficult.130 Further research needs to be conducted on the implementation of cyber 
hygiene in the face of ever-changing cybersecurity threats.  
Examining Existing Cyber Hygiene Literature 
One of the useful steps in raising the bar for cybersecurity vulnerabilities is to 
examine the current strategies and opinions of federal organizations and government 
contractors towards human behavior in cybersecurity. Doing so will create a baseline of 
how organizations with the most responsibility for defending against basic exploitations. 
The following section will examine publically available documents such as white papers, 
capabilities literature, and published interviews with a select number of large government 
contractors, small 8(a) designated government contracting firms, and major US 
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government organizations managing critical infrastructure. 131 
The government contractors and federal organizations selected were: contractors 
Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, Booz Allen Hamilton, and 
SAIC;  ASCRC Research and Technology Solutions LLC, Four LLC,  Bowhead Science 
and Technology LLC, Cherokee Nation Technology Solutions LLC, and TKC Global 
Solutions; and the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and 
Department of Transportation.  
The government contractors were selected because these companies hold 
significant cybersecurity/information technology contracts with the federal government. 
Since 85% of the country’s critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private 
sector, it is important to examine the private sector’s approach towards cybersecurity.132 
Government contractors are held to much more rigorous standards, with laws such as the 
Federal Acquisition Regulations, as opposed to regular contractual agreements typically 
implemented by companies in the private sector. The smaller 8a contracting firms were 
selected from Washington Technology’s 2014 largest 8a contractors list based on revenue 
in 2013 from IT contracts awarded by the federal government. The top five firms listed 
were chosen for evaluation.  
The federal organizations chosen for their relative importance in critical 
infrastructure and dependence on cybersecurity to protect their information and systems. 
The management of the energy, defense, finance, transportation, and telecommunications 
                                                      
131
 8(a) is a designation for government contracting firms that are owned and managed by socially and 
economically disadvantaged individuals. There are a variety of requirements including the owner’s assets 
must be under $4 million dollars, the adjusted gross income of the owner must less than $200,000 at the 
time of the application, and the company must have a North American Industry Classification code that 
meets the definition of small business by the Small Business Administration.  
 
132
 Government Accountability Office. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Cybersecurity for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection. www.gao.gov/new.items/d04321.pdf (accessed July 15, 2012). 
86 
 
sectors are vital to the country’s national security and well-being.  
Findings 
A comparison of official views of the public and private sectors will establish a 
public dialog on human behavior in the cybersecurity equation and reveal whether the 
term “cyber hygiene” is being utilized in the world by organizations. In cases where 
organizations use the term “cyber hygiene”, a definition is established based on its usage 
in publicly available documents, which will show areas of consensus or gaps in 
cybersecurity positions and tactics in terms of the most basic vulnerabilities of these 
critical networks.  
Many federal departments have at least one document explicitly stating its views 
on security and overall strategy. There is also a variety of materials that include 
testimonies that further clarify or update memos on their cybersecurity strategies.  
Public documentation of these government contracting companies’ cybersecurity 
strategies was pieced together from public comments and documentation other than 
formal strategies. Company websites were reviewed for any public documentation of 
their strategies or tactics, as were public interviews with company executives and 
sponsored researchers.   
 Lockheed Martin- A search on Lockheed Martin’s website did not show a 
dedicated document for cyber hygiene. The site lists a variety of services that it offers, 
including security awareness, training, and education; red and blue team testing; and 
security compliance reviews. On the front page of the company’s product listing are 
training tools that mimic human behavior and fragilities to prepare users to be able to 
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counter live threats. It does not mention list training tools for end-users.133 In addition, 
four white papers are published on the Information Technology Group’s website.134 One 
specifically focuses on cloud computing security, though most of its recommendations in 
regards to human behavior were relatively benign. Lockheed Martin states that any 
government organization’s security policies should extend to users accessing 
applications. It also mentions that systems, staff, training, and policies should be assessed 
and adjusted over time.135  
Another white paper focuses on computer-network defense, specifically on 
advance persistent threats.136 Traditionally, most organizations have relied on 
technologies and processes implemented to mitigate risks associated with automated 
viruses and worms, and not necessarily manually-operated APT intrusions. Responding 
after as intrusion is based on two flawed assumptions: responses should happen after a 
security breach, and that the breach was based on a fixable flaw.  One study mentioned in 
the white paper found that end- users of computer networks are directly targeted for their 
access to sensitive information. The paper presents a specific solution called the 
intelligence-driven computer network defense, which is a risk management strategy that 
includes analysis of adversaries and their capabilities, objectives, doctrine, and 
limitations. It then presents a new model for such intrusions, which focuses on a higher 
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level of strategy for computer network defensive measures. It does not mention anything 
regarding raising the level of end user vulnerabilities.   
Rick Doten, Chief Scientist at Lockheed Martin's Center for Cyber Security 
Innovation, was asked in an interview about non-technical aspects of cybersecurity. 
Doten said, “Technology is always the easy part, which, unfortunately, is why it’s always 
the first solution that’s thrown at a problem.” He focused on the necessity to find the right 
people and create the right processes for proper leadership. Once proper direction is 
established, then a move from a technology-driven approach towards risk-based approach 
can take place. 137  
Northrop Grumman (NG)- The company’s cybersecurity website lists a variety of 
literature promoting the strength of its employees, software, and services.138 A published 
interview with NG’s Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) includes a line 
mentioning the company’s belief in a top-down approach driven by its top executive. NG 
acknowledges the end-user as a weakness in the network or, as the CISO described in the 
interview, “the IT supply chain”. It also talked about the attack tactics such as spear 
phishing, a digital form of social engineering that uses authentic looking but fake requests 
information from users, used to target individuals in organizations.139 Spear phishing was  
the number one vector for exploiting weaknesses in governments and business. The 
company itself reviews its security plan, training and awareness, and countermeasures 
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against spear phishing.  The Most notable details was that the company spear phishes its 
employees to test their awareness.140 
General Dynamics (GD)- There was no literature found on the company’s 
website. The website provided a very basic overview of services and products, but none 
of the information reference managing neither human behavior nor cyber hygiene. In an 
interview with Bill Ross, Director of Cyber Mission Assurance Systems, he said that the 
culture was the toughest problem to tackle because there needs to be a balance between 
access to information, transparency, and end user responsibility. Ross said, “You are only 
as good as your weakest link, so teaching people the culture of what it means to be 
stewards within the cyber domain is going to be a huge challenge.” 141  
Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH)- The company had a substantial amount of published 
thought pieces on cybersecurity that included reports, surveys, articles, and videos. There 
were no results from a search on the company’s website for literature that focused on the 
human behavior aspect of cybersecurity. 142 The cyber solutions capabilities brochure 
claims to provides training to clients through the Booz Allen Cyber Training Center. 
Training included defensive and offensive techniques, so clients can learn to think like 
the enemy and defend themselves at the same time.143 BAH contributed to a report 
released by the Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center, listed under the 
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Department of Defense findings. 
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) -   While most of SAIC’s 
website was similar to the previously mentioned government contractors, with its 
proprietary cybersecurity products and services. One of the search results within the 
company website was an article that talked about five things that kept the executives up 
at night, and one of the five items was the lack of proper workforce training. The 
executive argued that the best return on investment in cybersecurity is by training the 
workforce because it has the greatest range of threats from bad user practices to social 
engineering. The article listed its proprietary iSecure training application that it requires 
its employees to use every year. 144  
ASCRC Research and Technology Solutions LLC-  The company lists its broad 
areas of expertise such as information technology, decision support, and programmatic 
support. It also has a list of federal agency clients and contracted services. It does not 
reference specific cybersecurity but in a search for job openings, the firm has a position 
for a cyber security compliance officer. The officer is responsible for managing all 
aspects of compliance internally and with external clients.145 There are references to 
developing and implementation of measures to meet compliance and monitoring so there 
is a possibility of developing measures that could incorporate cyber hygiene. Within the 
job posting, it referenced an internal group called the Security Working Group that is to 
provide input on security goals and integrate security goals with business goals.146  
Four Inc- It is a woman-owned company that provides technology solutions. It 
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does not list any specific capabilities within cybersecurity. It does show that the company 
offers security products from cyber security vendors such as Mcafee, VMware, Lumeta, 
Forescout.147  
Bowhead Science and Technology LLC- The company listed information 
assurance, program protection, and anti-tamper as critical capabilities within cyber 
security. It does not go into greater detail about its thought leadership of cybersecurity. 
Job descriptions also posted  did not reveal any significant internal organization inclusive 
of security or compliance. It showed that it will hire contract employees to provide cyber 
security services in order to fulfill certain government contracts awarded to the company 
such as network security engineer identifying software and solutions for developing 
Intrusion Detection Architecture for NSWC Crane networks. 148  
Cherokee Nation Technology Solutions LLC- It lists a multitude of technology 
services including management information systems, network infrastructure 
management, and software development but excludes cyber security as an offering.149 
There is a lack of insight into the company’s security. The available job postings also do 
not indicate any current job vacancies internally focused on cybersecurity.  
TKC Global Solutions LLC- This company lists a broad set of capabilities within 
its cybersecurity holdings. It includes services under these categories: monitoring, 
detection, analysis and response, and recovery. It mentions the ability to provide services 
for cloud based platform, bring your own devices (BYOD) , and managing insider 
threats. It lists specific cybersecurity services provided to Bureau of Indian Affairs, 
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Department of Homeland Security, and Defense Information Systems Agency, and US 
Army.150 It shows a very clear set of capabilities within cybersecurity and publicly lists 
the manner in which the company has supported government agencies in their 
cybersecurity efforts. It may be the smallest 8a contractor of the group, but it presents the 
information as clearly as ASCRC, a larger competitor in the 8a market for technology 
contracts with the government.   
Department of Defense- The DOD’s Strategy for Operation in Cyberspace stated 
the necessity to address human behavior related vulnerabilities and potential threats with 
“cyber hygiene.” The analogy defined an activity that was to be regularly practiced by 
users and administrators to maintain information security. It stressed that maintenance for 
users and administrators, secure network design and implementation, and proper 
management of the network, were all important factors. The combination of those parts 
creates a holistic approach towards a secure network.151 
Most importantly, it listed people as the DOD’s first line of defense to reducing 
intentional and unintentional insider threats. The tactics listed to strengthen its first line of 
defense included communication, personnel training, new technologies, and processes. 
The cumulative effect of integrating these categories will improve end user security, 
through educated end-users with clearer understanding of procedures to ensure that they 
will not be exploited by sophisticated hackers. It also mentioned the desire for the DOD 
to foster a culture of information assurance.152 The creation of this culture to increase 
individual responsibility and deter malicious insiders by affecting behaviors and norms 
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with imposed higher costs to operate.  
The National Cyber Range was listed as one of the tools to execute realistically, 
quantifiable assessments of the country’s cyber research. The Cyber Range is a national 
research for individuals to test technologies and systems in a contained environment. 
Researchers will look for vulnerabilities from component to the system level, and from 
events such as buggy code, misconfigurations, and user actions in realistic situations. 153 
The Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center (IATAC) under the 
direction of the DOD created a report, with the guidance from BAH, on the state of the 
environment of measuring cybersecurity and information assurance in 2009. One section 
of the report was dedicated to measuring security knowledge and implementation of the 
security knowledge.  In a Master thesis, Measuring Information Security Awareness by 
Johnny Mathisen, he argued that there is a discrepancy between what people say and 
what they do when it involves measuring the change in human behavior, especially when 
it comes to information security education and training. The reported Mathisen’s metrics 
as well as custom metrics developed by other organizations, some of the examples listed 
were the Internet Security Forum, United Kingdom (UK) Chapter of the Information 
Systems Security Association, US Army, and the Gartner Group. Mathisen’s nine metrics- 
% of employees completed the necessary security training, # of reported security 
incidents, % of clean desks at COB, % of waste paper that shredded, $ of illicit traffic on 
the internal network, % of weak user passwords, # of hits on web pages about security, # 
of requests for information assistance by the security office, and customer satisfaction. 154 
                                                      
153
DARPA. "The National Cyber Range: A National Testbed for Critical Security Research." White House. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/cyber/DARPA%20-%20NationalCyberRange_FactSheet.pdf 
(accessed August 14, 2012). 
154
 Bartol, Nadya, Brian Bates, Karen Mercedes Goertzel, and Theodore Winograd. "Measuring Cyber 
94 
 
Some of the challenges to establishing a program to measure information security 
properly revealed in a 2007 Forrester survey of 19 Chief Information Security Officers 
about their current IT security practices. The top challenges for implementation were the 
following: Finding the right metrics and translating the security metrics into “business 
language.” Forrester’s analysts also noted the following observations- metrics were 
focused on operational and project status, and driven by compliance concerns, confusion 
about security measurements with metrics, and security metrics collected were not useful 
for their intended purpose or audience.155 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-  DHS published Cybersecurity 
Strategy for the Homeland Security Enterprise in November 2011. The strategy provided 
an outline to protect critical systems and assets essential to the United States. One of the 
sections of the strategy was dedicated to the promotion of cybersecurity knowledge. 
Some of the objectives included education and awareness campaigns that were created to 
help increase awareness among the workforce. Some of the campaigns are DHS has the 
“Stop. Think. Connect” campaign, Cyber Awareness Coalition; Stay Safe Online; 
National Cyber Security Awareness Month activities across all levels around the country. 
There should also be best practices and guidelines for actions individuals to strengthen 
individual defenses. Moreover, mechanisms that notify users that devices and systems 
have weakness or are infected, enabling them to take action. 156 
While the majority of the recommendations revolved around the technology, there 
was a section devoted to the usage of the technology. Some of the items listed to reduce 
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(end user) vulnerabilities were a security product evaluation or validation regimes and to 
improve usability. Designing trusted technology that is easy to use, administer, 
customizable, and to perform as expected. Some of the core capabilities are requirements 
and guidelines that indicate acceptable characteristic for assembly, configuration, 
operations administration, and performance such as the human computer interface 
standards by American National Standards Institute and UsabilityNet. Finally, to improve 
usability, create studies to determine the aspects of security technology that lead to rapid 
adoption and standardization within relevant user communities. 157  
Department of Transportation (DOT)- There was no official strategy listed on the 
website for the Office of the Chief Information Officer, DOT. There was no information 
on the DOT’s website alluding to human behavior in the cybersecurity. The website listed 
some general cybersecurity priorities for the DOT: to follow federal cybersecurity 
initiatives such as the National Security Presidential Directive 54/ Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 23; to enhance the support for the DOT Cyber Security 
Management Center, enhance cyber incident response and situational awareness of the 
DOT cyber infrastructure, and improve information sharing capabilities with the DHS. 
The office of CIO will need to enhance verification and validation functions as required 
by statute, expand the use of OMB reporting tools. And increase the use of automation 
tools in order to reduce verification and validation burden on DOT system and service 
owners. The Office will need to modernize the DOT’s certification and accreditation 
program by using new technology and processes, expand the use of Cyber Security 
Assessment and Management tool, and enhance data quality reviews to identify and 
correct performance gaps. Finally, the Office will need to enhance compliance with 





federal statutes and requirements to protect privacy information and ensure closure of 
privacy performance gaps. 158 
Analysis 
These organizations show varying degrees of sophistication of presentation of its 
thought leadership in its external and internal management of cybersecurity and human 
behavior. The much larger contractors and government organizations included significant 
thought leadership on cyber hygiene, its application, and definitions. It shows the largest 
public and private organizations are aware of the concept and more likely to take the 
concept into consideration with its implementation. It should not be surprising these 
organizations have published documentation because of their substantial resources.   
The 8a contractors selected to represent small medium enterprises showed a 
varying degree of sophistication in cybersecurity much less cyber hygiene. ASRC and 
TKC were the companies with the most sophisticated presentation of cybersecurity 
offerings and references to services that can be related to cyber hygiene. The lack of 
sophistication in cybersecurity provides an area for further research and publicity for 
improving the broad spectrum of SMEs’ working knowledge and application of 
cybersecurity practices, especially cyber hygiene. Cyber hygiene should be broken down 
for SMEs for technical, organizational, and individual application through education and 
training.  
Proposed Definition for Cyber Hygiene  
Cybersecurity defense tactics will have to continue to be fluid while strategies are 
solidified. The defense is no longer a line drawn in the sand; it is drawn in space, and it 
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must regularly be redrawn to prevent unauthorized access to networks. Many public and 
private sector leaders have talked about cyber hygiene and presented examples of cyber 
hygiene, but none have stated a clear definition for it. The paper proposes the following 
definition as a starting point in clarifying term ‘cyber hygiene.’ Cyber hygiene has very 
specific characteristics mentioned in various published documents but not explicitly 
codified.  
Authorized software and devices- the Individual user only using pre-approved 
software and devices to transmit information within and outside of the network.159  
Individual user security maintenance- Individuals user is regularly updating 
security codes, questions (passwords, pins, personal identification information), and virus 
patches for applications, systems, and networks.160  
Actively reject exploitations- Individual user actively rejecting all types of 
attempts by hackers or any other unauthorized individuals from gaining accessing and 
exploiting the user’s access privileges. It requires education and training on how to 
recognize such attempts. 
Planned response- If an individual user notices unfamiliar activity in their daily 
activity within the network, the user should know whom to contact to report the incident 
immediately and how to document the unauthorized activity. 
These four types of characteristics succinctly define what cyber hygiene in an 
analogous definition or at least building blocks to a formal definition understood by 
business managers of small and medium businesses. The definition extends the 
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responsibility of maintaining network security from abstract organizational policy to 
individual user responsibility. It also lists specific areas previously mentioned in the 
paper as actual exploitations. The increased security awareness of the importance of 
ongoing maintenance will raise the bar for hackers who attempt to access privileged 
networks. These activities are not beyond the capabilities of individual users at all levels 
of an organization.  
Researchers will have to discover which metrics is appropriate for organizations 
to create appropriate baselines for user and system responsibilities for reducing network 
vulnerabilities.  
Conclusion 
As much interest in cybersecurity research increases, there should also be a 
consideration in demystifying cybersecurity concepts and uncovering the best practices 
for successful technical and non-technical cybersecurity tactics. The proposed definition 
of the cyber hygiene would be important for policy makers and business leaders to have a 
better understanding of the term while reducing the casual use of the term in the media. 
The proper understanding cyber hygiene could lead to better policy to address the 
cybersecurity tactics. 
While there is substantive research on cybersecurity, there is still a significant 
amount of room for a variety quantitative and qualitative research in managing end-user 
activity in cyberspace and reducing vulnerabilities around them. Developing better cyber 
security responses will rely on further research in the end user's psychology, user 
interface, system design, cybersecurity policies and organization culture.161  These are 
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some of the issues that will need to be investigated further to improve the understanding 
of the concept and its application for companies. 
The evidence from research points to some anecdotal awareness of the 
vulnerability of individual user behavior in cybersecurity across the public and private 
sectors, with variance between the large and smaller government contracting companies. 
The simpler cost-saving tactic of applying the cyber hygiene concept goes against the 
reason government contracting firms providing only technical cybersecurity solutions. 
Government contracting firms should consider promoting this concept because it 
increases the value of other tools and services required by the government organizations. 
While it is not in the interest of contractors to provide such services, it is part of their 
fiduciary duty to improve the overall security of government networks.  
Cyber hygiene is a simpler, more cost-effective tactic for organizations of all size 
to incorporate in its network security policy. It can certainly increase the value of 
cybersecurity without necessarily significantly raising the cost of cybersecurity 
investment. It will enhance security by reducing the expected areas of opportunity for 
hackers. It can reduce the risk of hackers attempting to social engineer their way into 
breaking into the network as well as reduce the risk of insider threats such as disgruntled 
employees. These two types of threats are necessary to manage, but technical solutions do 
not mitigate as much as it could when combined with cyber hygiene. 
All organizations should consider expanding on its cybersecurity strategy to 
include cyber hygiene as a cost-effective way to increase the end-user vulnerabilities in 
very sensitive systems and networks. As larger companies and government contractors 
embrace cyber hygiene, it will set an example for other small and medium size 
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businesses. It is especially important for small and medium sized businesses to embrace 
the concept since most companies in the US are comprised of small and medium size 
businesses. By making a standardized definition is a start for small and medium size 
businesses to understand advance topics underneath the broader term of cybersecurity. 
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 Cyberspace is an evolving environment that provides significant opportunities and 
risks. SMEs have access to greater innovation, cost reduction, and marketing 
opportunities than ever before. The lack of governance in cyberspace has provided 
opportunities taken advantage by SMEs, but few are managing the risks related to the 
lack of law and order in cyberspace. SMEs need develop tools to manage risk because 
evident vulnerabilities will be eventually exploited by the criminally minded. Some of the 
risks can be managed by the company itself as shown with cyber hygiene and cyber 
insurance and another takes a collective effort such as community policing but all require 
awareness of what the particular risks for operating in cyberspace.   
These solutions take a variety of investment of either time or money with SMEs, 
but they are the type of ideas that can help spur interest in alternative concepts to improve 
the overall risk management. These solutions are somewhat out of the box in terms of 
using collective power for policing, cyber hygiene to mitigate risk and self-insurance to 
deal with the accepted risk. Without the awareness and a risk management strategy, it is 
easy to be swept up by trends an 
These three papers mainly fall under the general themes of SMEs collaboratively 
sharing information in order to better operate in the current environment. SMEs 
individually will always operate at a disadvantage compared to large enterprises because 
of the lack of access to budgets and knowledgeable professionals to formulate better 
policies. However, the collaborative power of SMEs can equalize the playing field in 
terms or accessing resources and professionals.  
This research paper aims to present specific issues that are important towards the 
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overall conversation of cybersecurity and provide reasonable solutions for resolving these 
problems in the immediate future for SMEs. At first glance, the solutions may appear to 
be simplistic but if simplification can lead to greater understanding and initiative by the 
leadership of both sectors to implement changes then it will have proved its usefulness in 
the policy discussion. There are countless problems with equally countless solutions but 
if simplification can inspire action to develop a further secure cyberspace. The 
complexity will never go away, but the systematic approach to solving problems for the 
major stakeholders will improve the proactive participation and potentially lead to great 
collaboration to voluntarily build a security framework that works for all.  
It also provides an opportunity for policy maker and business leaders to take a 
step away from the over-reliance on technology to solve all of ones problems. It utilizes 
seemingly unimportant things such as cooperation, insurance, and active awareness to 
manage the risk of operating in cyberspace. The consequences for not doing seemingly 
simple things are much more significant once the surface is scratched. The less obvious 
take away from these three portfolio papers that while a necessity to present novel 
concepts to have a greater chance of understanding by leadership. It does not replace the 
necessity that the leadership have to have buy-in, in order to execute these ideas. The 
combination of curiosity and education will give leadership an opportunity to incorporate 











2015  JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY | M.A. Government     WASHINGTON, DC 
 Coursework: Public/Private Management, Federal Contracting 
Law, Negotiation, International Political Economics, 
Cybersecurity Policy, and Information Operations. 
 Thesis focuses on improving small and medium business 
cybersecurity through novel solutions such as cyber insurance, 
cyber hygiene, and community policing in cyberspace. 
2007 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY | B.S. Business Administration  WASHINGTON, DC 
 Completed university coursework in three years while interning 
at the following organizations: National Student Partnerships 
(now known as LIFT), Management Systems International, and 
the American Electronics Association (now part of 
TechAmerica.) 
 Dean’s List.  
 
WORK EXPERIENCE 
2013 – 2014 STEWARD PARTNERS GLOBAL ADVISORY | Contract Position  WASHINGTON, DC 
 Established and cultivated working relationships with advisory 
businesses and financial institutions, ensuring the smooth 
transition of a $148 million book of high net worth clients 
brought over from Morgan Stanley.  
 Analyzed each household’s financial holdings to determine 
which assets could be transitioned, creating individual transition 
strategies for the largest households.  
2011 – 2013 MORGAN STANLEY | Financial Advisor        WASHINGTON, DC 
 Built relationships with wealthy business leaders, resulting in 
the addition of $13.5 million of assets to the practice and 
achieving a 92.1% return on those assets. 
 Converted $8 million of assets into managed accounts, 
providing an additional $780 thousand in reoccurring revenue.   
 Extended an additional $23 million of available credit to 
existing clients, whose portfolios previously had not included 
any lending products. 
 Collaborated with a senior partner and other senior executives to 
develop and implement asset acquisition strategies that resulted 
sales of an additional $1 million of annuities, $2 million of 
insurance, $300 thousand of long term care insurance. 
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 Maintained connections with current and potential investors, 
including lobbyists, estate lawyers, and executives of major 
public and private corporations.  
 Achieved top tier status within the national Financial Advisor 
Associate Training Program. 
 2007 – 2010 MORGAN STANLEY SMITH BARNEY | Registered Associate        WASHINGTON, DC 
 Developed and implemented a strategy to deepen financial 
relationships with existing clients and to cultivate relationships 
with new clients, resulting in 10 new clients with $24 million in 
new assets.  
 Systematically analyzed portfolios to identify additional 
investment, lending, and insurance sales opportunities resulting 
in the acquisition of an additional $2 million of managed 
accounts, $6 million of insurance, and a further $1.75 million of 
refinanced home loans.  
 Conducted in-depth market research for strategic business 
development initiatives. 
 Hired, managed, and mentored eight interns over the course of 
three and a half years, all of whom went onto successful careers 
at leading investment firms such as Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, 
and Credit Suisse. 
 2006 – 2007 CITIGROUP SMITH BARNEY | Marketing and Research Intern     WASHINGTON, DC 
 Structured and updated securities models to track earnings 
growth, profitability, and valuations of equity positions. 
 Analyzed portfolio performance and conducted research on core 
equity holdings.  
 Coordinated recruitment, selection, and training of interns in 
compliance with hiring guidelines. 
 
LEARNING EXPERIENCE 
2014 – 2014 DOKAZI | Co-Founder and Chief Operating Officer WASHINGTON, DC 
 Conducted market research to inform the creation of a business 
plan and marketing strategy for an early-stage technology 
company that aimed to create an online marketplace to connect 
data scientists with small and medium sized businesses for 
short-term projects. 
 Conducted research on potential investors and met with venture 
capitalists, angels, and successful sitting entrepreneurs.  
 After further analysis of the existing market situation and 
financing options, the concept was found to be too nascent to 
attract necessary number of qualified data scientists and 
companies with clearly articulated projects requiring such skills. 
 
